WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT

Hearing No. 3623, Volume XVIII

Helena, Montana July 14, 2005 1:00 p.m.

CASSANDRA M. SCHMILL,

Laurie Wallace

FILED

LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORP.

Larry W. Jones

JUL 2 6 2005

and

MONTANA STATE FUND

WCC No.: 2001-0300

Bradley J. Luck WORKERS COMPENSATION JUDGE HELEHA, MONTANA

ALEXIS RAUSCH, et al.

MONTANA STATE FUND

Lon J. Dale

Thomas E. Martello

Bradley J. Luck

Thomas J. Harrington

and

TEREMY RUHD

LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORP.

WCC No. 9907-8274R1

Larry W. Jones Carrie L. Garber

ROBERT FLYNN and CARL MILLER

MONTANA STATE FUND

and

LBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORP.

(Intervenor)

WCC No. 2000-0222

Rex Palmer

Bradley J. Luck

Larry W. Jones

Thomas J. Harrington

DALE REESOR

Thomas J. Murphy

MONTANA STATE FUND

Bradley J. Luck

WCC No. 2002-0676

Thomas J. Harrington

Heard before The Honorable Mike McCarter

SHERRON K. WALSTAD, Court Reporter Lesofski & Walstad Court Reporting 21 North Last Chance Gulch, Suite 201 Helena, Montana 59601 (406) 443-2010

DOCKET ITEM NO

Page 2		
1	APPEARA	NCES
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	THE HONORABLE MIKE McCARTER,	JUDGE
3		
4	THE FOLLOWING ATTORNEYS AND/O	
	PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFERENC	E:
5		
6	Leo S. Ward	David A. Hawkins
7	Carrie L. Garber	Thomas A. Marra
8	Rex Palmer	Mark E. Cadwallader
9	Lon J. Dale	Michael P. Heringer
10	Larry W. Jones	Thomas E. Martello
	Thomas J. Murphy	Bryce R. Floch
	Diana Ferriter	Greg E. Overturf
	Steven Jennings	Debra Gilcrest
	Thomas J. Harrington	Bradley J. Luck
	Laurie Wallace	Richard H. Davenport
	Nancy Butler	James Hunt
	Ron Thuesen	K.D. Feeback
	Julie Swingley	Carol Gleed
19		
20		
	THE FOLLOWING ATTORNEYS AND/OR TELEPHONE:	PARTIES PARTICIPATED BY
22		
I	Ronald W. Atwood	Sandi Pack
23	~ 7 '	Gail Burgess
I	Lloyd Williams	
24		
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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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1 2 3	WORKERS' COMPENSATION	ON COURT	
4 5	Hearing No. 3623, Volume XVIII	Helena, Montana July 14, 2005	
6	CASSANDRA M. SCHMILL,	Laurie Wallace	
7	LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORP.	Larry W. Jones	
8	MONTANA STATE FUND	Bradley J. Luck WCC No. 2001-0300	
9	ALEXIS RAUSCH, et al.	Lon J. Dale	
10	MONTANA STATE FUND	Thomas E. Martello Bradley J. Luck Thomas J. Harrington	
12	and JEREMY RUHD v.		
13 14	LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORP.	Larry W. Jones Carrie L. Garber WCC No. 9907-8274R1	
15		Rex Palmer	
16	V. MONTANA STATE FUND	Bradley J. Luck Thomas J. Harrington	
17 18	and LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORP. (Intervenor)		
19		WCC No. 2000-0222	
20	DALE REESOR	Thomas J. Murphy	
21	MONTANA STATE FUND	Bradley J. Luck Thomas J. Harrington WCC No. 2002-0676	-
22	On the 14th day of Tales 2005		
23	On the 14th day of July, 2005, beginning at 1:00 p.m., the above-entitled matter came before		
24	The Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge of the Workers' Compensation Court. The hearing was held at the Workers' Compensation Court offices in Helena, Montana,		
25	and the court reporter was Sherron * * * * * * * * *	K. Walstad.	

Page 5 1 WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had: 1 several insurers. 2 2 MR. WARD: Leo Ward, with Browning 3 3 Kaleczyc. THE COURT: We have Ronald Atwood on. 4 4 MS. SWINGLEY: Julie Swingley, Drake Law 5 Sandi Pack, Julie Pollack, Gail Burgess, and Lloyd 5 Firm. 6 Williams participating by telephone. Can all of you 6 MR. HERINGER: Mike Heringer, Brown Law 7 hear me? 7 Firm. 8 UNIDENTIFIED PERSON: Yes, Judge. 8 MR. MARRA: Tom Marra. 9 THE COURT: Let me go around the room and 9 MS. GARBER: Carrie Garber, with 10 have everybody identify themselves for our record; and 10 Liberty. the rule will be when you speak, just identify yourself 11 11 MR. JENNINGS: Steve Jennings, with 12 before you speak. We'll start with Tom. 12 Crowley, on behalf of several insurers. 13 MR. HARRINGTON: Tom Harrington with the 13 MS. GILCREST: Debra Gilcrest, of 14 Garlington Law Firm. 14 McDonald and Lind, on behalf of Montana Resources. 15 MR. LUCK: Brad Luck, the Garlington Law 15 MS. BUTLER: Nancy Butler, Montana State Firm for the State Fund. 16 16 Fund. 17 MR. JONES: Larry Jones, Liberty 17 THE COURT: Did we get everybody? 18 Northwest. 18 MR. HAWKINS: David Hawkins, State Fund. 19 MR. PALMER: Rex Palmer, for Petitioners 19 THE COURT: Okay. We've got a lot to 20 Flynn and Miller. 20 cover today. I'm going to start with some things that 21 MS. WALLACE: Laurie Wallace, for 21 pertain to all of the cases. We have one participant 22 Schmill. 22 who will drop off of the telephone after we've finished 23 MR. HUNT: Jim Hunt, for Satterly. 23 those, and I've got four items on that agenda. I'll 24 MR. MURPHY: Tom Murphy, for Stavenjord, 24 just go down, because some of them aren't too Reesor and Satterly. 25 25 difficult. Page 4 Page 6 1 MR. DALE: Lon Dale, appearing for Kevin 1 First, I would appreciate if we could get a 2 Rausch and also appearing on behalf of Steve Roberts list from each attorney as to who they represent in 3 and Monte Beck in regard to Fisch and Frost. 3 each of these cases. We can compile that information. 4 THE COURT: Is Steve in Columbia now? 4 I have a suspicion you're going to know that off the 5 MR. DALE: I believe so, Your Honor. I top of your head, and if you can send us that 6 think he should change his address. 6 information, maybe e-mail us that information, we will 7 MR. CADWALLADER: Mark Cadwallader, 7 compile that and then we can probably take it from 8 Department of Labor and Industry, both on the there and track it. Because in a lot of these cases, a 9 regulatory side and also with respect to the Uninsured 9 number of you represent multiple clients, and it will 10 Employers' Fund. 10 just make my life easier if I know who all you're 11 MS. GLEED: Carol Gleed, Department of 11 representing in each case, and I'll follow that up with 12 Labor and Industry. 12 an e-mail to everybody to renew that request. 13 MR. MARTELLO: Tom Martello, State Fund. 13 The second thing on the comment to all the 14 MR. OVERTURF: Greg Overturf, State 14 cases is "confidential information." Sometimes we're 15 Fund. 15 getting information that's sort of in the form of a 16 MR. HOPKINS: Brian Hopkins, Labor and general response but may have some claimant-16 17 Industry. 17 identifying information on it. We don't want to put 18 MR. DAVENPORT: Rick Davenport, Putman & that out on the Web because of the privacy concerns of 18 19 Associates. the claimant, so we're not putting it out on the Web.

MR. FEEBACK: K. D. Feeback, on behalf of Cominco American.

MR. FLOCH: Bryce Floch, with Hammer,

Hewitt, Sandler and Jacobs, on behalf of multiple

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insureds.

MR. THUESEN: Ron Thuesen, on behalf of

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difficult.

We're having to review every document, and that becomes

I think we will continue to review it, but

to endorse that across the face or at the top of it.

I'm wondering if what I might request you to do is when

you have claimant information and documents, would be

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Does that make any sense to do that? Is that a good procedure to follow? Does anybody have a better idea or think that it's unnecessary?

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MR. HAWKINS: Good idea, Judge.

MS. WALLACE: Are you talking about in all of our general pleadings?

THE COURT: No, just in any document that you file that contains any information pertaining to an identifiable claimant, is on that document, to endorse it up on the top. It would be nice to have a red stamp somewhere up at the top saying "Contains confidential information." And that will alert us immediately that that is not something that we want to go on the Internet, and we won't have to review that. We'll know that from the very beginning.

MS. WALLACE: And that is just in common fund cases?

THE COURT: Just in common fund cases. When we go to e-filing, we'll have to talk about that too, because we'll probably want to do something similar when we e-file, or we're going to want to redact. But at least for now, we're just talking the common fund cases.

And maybe we can come up with some sort of format that we can use. I'm thinking maybe underneath,

1 somewhere on the face of the document, not necessarily

2 in the title. In the title, if it's convenient, but

3 somewhere on the face of the document it should say a 4 printout or something, a list of claimants.

THE COURT: You mean where you don't have a caption on it?

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7 MR. CADWALLADER: Where you don't have a 8 caption on a document.

THE COURT: Right. Actually, in that 10 case it would be nice to stamp it "confidential."

MR. CADWALLADER: Right, Thank you.

12 THE COURT: In a number of these cases we 13 have a number of insurers that are in liquidation, and

I don't -- I think I had a -- For some cases I have a 14

list of some of those, and for other cases I don't. 15

16 The question is, how are we going to handle those. At

least where they go to the Western Guaranty Fund, the 17 18 Western Guaranty Fund is handling it, but as I

19 understand it, there's a lot of files that are in the

20 possession of liquidators. 21

I guess the question is: Who is responsible for those files and how do we handle those? Has anybody thought about that? Who is representing the Western Guaranty Fund?

MR. HARRINGTON: Judge --

you know, where you put the title of the document, you know, the response to petition or something like that, you could put in big block letters, "Contains

confidential information," or something like that.

We'll try to come up with a format for that.

Hearing no nay-sayers, I'll request everybody to do that. We'll still review the documents, but we want to be careful about what we're doing.

Okav. Let's talk about --

MR. HAWKINS: Maybe you can make a part of the official caption for common fund cases "confidential information," "yes," "no," with one box to check. That way, it's uniform, it's simple. everybody does it. It's always there. The attorney has got to address it.

THE COURT: I suppose. Do all of you have a common caption that you use, that you just drag down? That might be the way to do it. Then you're sort of forced to check the box or not. I'll probably end up leaving that to you whether you want to do the check-off or do the endorsement. The check-off would make it easy for you to do it, as long as you look at

22 23 the caption, but, see, I never look at my captions. So 24 it could be a problem, but be thinking about it.

MR. CADWALLADER: Clarification, endorse

THE COURT: You are.

MR. HARRINGTON: Yeah.

THE COURT: You and Kelly?

4 MR. HARRINGTON: We are. And it's my 5 understanding that the files don't get to the Western

Guaranty Fund until there's actually an order of liquidation; and while an insurer is in liquidation,

claims are made through the liquidator.

So the Guaranty Fund doesn't get involved until there's been an order from whatever state that says that this insurance company needs to be

liquidated, and it's a long process, from what I

13 understand. 14

THE COURT: Some of these companies have already been liquidated; am I right?

MR. HARRINGTON: Yes.

17 THE COURT: Can we develop a list of 18 those companies? Do you know what they are, which ones 19 they are?

MR. HARRINGTON: I know of four of them, but I can talk to the Western Guaranty Fund to get a

22 complete list for you, yes.

23 THE COURT: If they are in liquidation, 24 basically the common fund claims are going to go to the 25 Western Guaranty Fund.

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MR. HARRINGTON: No, Judge, I think they only get to the Western Guaranty Fund after there's an order of liquidation. While they're in a state of liquidation, you have to make the claim. It's like a bankruptcy. You have to make the claim through the liquidator.

THE COURT: Right, but for the ones that have been liquidated, that's the word I needed to use, then all of those claims would go through the Western Guaranty Fund?

MR. HARRINGTON: That's my understanding. THE COURT: So if we can ascertain those companies that have been liquidated, then we can just refer those all to you and won't have to worry about liquidators or whatever.

Let's see, who was the attorney on the phone who had the liquidation going on?

MS. BURGESS: Judge, this is Gail Burgess, with Reliance Liquidation.

THE COURT: Is it in liquidation or has it been liquidated?

MS. BURGESS: Well, I'm not sure I understand the way you're using those terms. We are the subject of a liquidation order that was entered October 3, 2001, so we are in liquidation, and the

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and notice of determination, and that claimant has the right, under procedures set forth by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, to file any objections to that notice of determination, and any issues as to it are resolved in the — liquidation estates are in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

THE COURT: In your case, in the case of your liquidation with Reliance, are there time parameters or is that still an open-ended process?

MS_BURGESS: For concluding a

MS. BURGESS: For concluding a liquidation?

12 THE COURT: Right.

MS. BURGESS: No, it's an open-ended process, and it's expected to take a lengthy period of time. So we have notices of determination. Under the court's order of September 9, 2002, the proofs of claim were to have been filed by December 31, 2003, and we're in the process of evaluating them and issuing notices of determination.

THE COURT: But there's a deadline on when the proofs of claim are supposed to be filed?

MS. BURGESS: There was an initial filing deadline of December 31, 2003, under the court's September 9, 2002 order. Anything filed after that, there needs to be a determination of good cause for

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liquidation is proceeding. As a liquidated company, if someone has a claim they want to present against the estate, they are to file a proof of claim with the estate, and we will evaluate it in the context of a liquidation.

If a claim has been made that involves, you know, October 3, 2001 forward, that date of our liquidation forward, then those go to the Guaranty Fund.

THE COURT: Okay. So prior to the liquidation order, they go to you. After the liquidation order, they go to the Guaranty Fund?

MS. BURGESS: Right. Well, if there was a claim that was with us that was an open claim, it would go to the Guaranty fund. So if you had a claim in which there were ongoing claims to be made, the Guaranty Fund would get, in the first instance, assuming it's a covered claim under their fund, they would handle that. If it were a closed claim at the time of the liquidation, it would not go to them.

THE COURT: Where would it go?
MS. BURGESS: It would be closed. We handle -- For us to have a claim, someone needs to file a proof of claim saying, "I have a claim to make against the estate," and then we evaluate that issue

1 filing late, beyond the December 31, 2003 deadline.

THE COURT: Do you understand the nature of these proceedings that we're having here in Montana?

MS. BURGESS: I'm not entirely sure. We only have notice of two cases, and both of which we filed our position, which is that we're not properly a party to either, and that any claims made against the estate need to be made in the proof-of-claim process.

So that any claims as to us pending there should be dismissed or stayed in favor of the proceedings here in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, and those two claims are Reesor and Flynn. We have filed our response setting forth our position.

THE COURT: Right. Do counsel in Reesor and Flynn, or for that matter, any of the other common fund cases for petitioners, have they thought about this and figured out how we're supposed to proceed?

this and figured out how we're supposed to proceed?

MR. PALMER: In Flynn, they have to
identify the people for us, so we don't know who are
the recipients or who the potential recipients are. So
the process she's proposing can't work. The people
that are entitled to benefits under the Flynn decision
don't know they're entitled, probably, and we don't

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know who they are. So there has to be this identification process that starts with the insurer.

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THE COURT: Well, yeah, do you understand what Mr. Palmer is saying? We don't know who the claimants are, and one of our jobs is to find out who they are in order to get them paid.

So, in essence, there's almost an investigatory process that's going on, a file-review process or some sort of computerized search of claims to figure out which claimants are entitled to additional benefits under these Montana decisions. I guess the question is: Who has jurisdiction to order that?

MR. MURPHY: In the Reesor case, we believe that the Court has the power, Ma'am, to tell you to identify the claimants who may be entitled to Reesor benefits. Many of the insurers in this room have already started that investigation process, and we think that the Reliance companies should do that also.

You will not get a proof of claim with the name of a claimant on it because you are the one that's got to determine the claimants that you denied benefits under Section 710.

MS. BURGESS: Well, I guess it's the chicken-or-the-egg issue. Our view, as I said in our 1 behalf to file a proof of claim.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. BURGESS: Well, can I suggest, you know, certainly everyone, I assume, is in agreement that we don't belong there in terms of adjudicating this thing, that that's properly here by proof of claim, and the issue seems to be how to identify the claimants as to which proofs of claim might be made.

THE COURT: Let me throw that out. Does everybody agree that, as far as the proof of claims and the order for payments, that has to be made in Pennsylvania, or whatever court has jurisdiction over the liquidation? Has anybody researched that?

14 I don't think anybody's even thought about it 15 very deeply at this point. I think that's one thing we 16 have to figure out is, number one, does this Court have jurisdiction to order Reliance or any of these 18 companies that are in liquidation proceedings to 19 identify these claimants; and number two, assuming that 20 the Court does, the second prong would be, does the Court have the authority to order the payment, or then do we have to go through the proof-of-claim process?

I suspect, from looking at my audience here of about 25 attorneys, that no one here has the answer to that off the top of our heads, and you might even be

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position filed with the Court, is that jurisdiction properly lies in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

All I can probably propose at this point is to take this issue back here with the people I would need to discuss it with and explain -- I'm not even sure what's really being proposed, that we would come up with a list of claimants on closed claims that we think these benefits might be implicated for? And I'm not even sure what the burden would be to do that and whether it's possible.

THE COURT: We have those questions in all of these cases.

MS. BURGESS: And, of course, we have the additional factor, being a liquidated company. So, you know, to expend the assets or resources of the company in such an endeavor, which may be impossible or highly burdensome, may be something the liquidator may well object to.

So I guess I'm trying to think of the best way to -- Well, I guess, first of all, maybe internally here is for us to discuss what would be involved in trying to identify the claimants, as you suggest, but we really would require proof of claim. And I guess I hear what you're saying. You don't know on whose

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in a better position to help us with that issue than 2 anyone in the room here.

MS. BURGESS: Yes. Well, certainly as to number one, I need to discuss that here internally. Certainly we'd argue you don't have the power to order us to do it, but whether it's something we could agree to do or work with you to do is Issue 1, and I need to vent that here.

Number two, definitely, our position is the Court does not have the power to compel Reliance, in liquidation, to make payments or to enter any sort of a judgment against the company in liquidation. I'd be happy to - We articulated that in our papers, and if necessary, I'd be happy to brief that more fully.

THE COURT: Do you have some citations in what you filed? I don't have your response here.

MS. BURGESS: I think at this point we simply did not put all the citations in. We can do that. It wasn't clear to me what the forum was here and whether we should provide, you know, a full briefing on it or just articulate, by way of response, our position.

23 THE COURT: Maybe what would be helpful is if you have some case laws and citations, just send 24 that, and perhaps by letter or maybe just a short

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filing with a caption on it, but nothing elaborate. It doesn't have to be elaborate; and then I'll provide it to the attorneys for the petitioners in these matters. Then they can take a look at it and see what they think about it, and I can take a look at it and see what I think about it.

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Perhaps, meanwhile, you can check to see if the Company would be willing to look for these claimants, at least identify them for us.

MS. BURGESS: All right. Let me tackle both of those things.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anybody who's here have anything they want to add to the discussion on liquidation? It's obviously something we're going to have to confront in all of these cases, and we need to figure it out. Any other ideas?

Okay, Ms. Burgess, I guess we'll close that part of it, so if you want to drop off, that would be fine with us. I do appreciate your helpfulness in this matter. It's something that we have to confront.

MS. BURGESS: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you. (Off the record briefly.)

THE COURT: Let's talk about another common issue. I had an e-mail from Carrie Garber, 1 I wonder if we need any more elaborate procedure than

that, if it's satisfactory just to identify those

3 respondents that come in -- the responses that come in 4

either by letter or by an actual formal response where 5 they indicate the information that I was talking about,

6 that they don't have anybody or they didn't write 7 insurance, and just send those to the claimants'

attorneys, have them respond. And if there is an 9 issue, if they think there's an issue, we can take it 10 up at that point. Otherwise, we'll dismiss them. Is

everybody happy with that?

MR. PALMER: It seems like a good way to go for us, the dismissal without prejudice on the initial showing that these are people that either didn't sell insurance during the applicable time period or they didn't have any permanent or temporary total disability claims, some of those basic things that just exclude them from these categories.

Some of them are seeking dismissal with prejudice, and that creates another problem because then we're going to need to receive some kind of affidavit, something that's not just their hunch that they didn't have any obligation here. But that's solved if we just dismiss without prejudice, because if something comes up later, we can bring them back in.

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which we've distributed. This concerns what we do, how we handle insurers that we've identified as on our

3 list, master list of insurers writing workers' 4

compensation insurance in Montana who have not written

workers' compensation insurance at all or have not written workers' compensation during the periods of

time in question in the particular cases, or they don't have any claims during the time frame we're talking

about, or they've looked and they have very few claims and they can't identify any claims that would qualify

and how we handle that.

Carrie had some questions about burden of proof and, I think, the elaborate procedure of filing motions and things like that. I guess at this point, the way we're handling them, and we've handled them with Tom Murphy, pretty much, at this point is, when we find those, Tom goes and he's been going through those, and if it appears that there's nothing further to be done with the insurer, we're dismissing them out without prejudice.

The only reason for dismissing them without prejudice is in case somebody finds out otherwise. I mean, I don't think we'll probably be bringing anybody else in. That's probably the end of it. But we've been just doing that fairly routinely in that case, and

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THE COURT: Maybe what we could do is. those that are requesting dismissal with prejudice, basically indicate that we're willing to dismiss them without prejudice; and if they need prejudice, then we may need more information from them.

MR. MURPHY: Judge, we view this in tiers. For the insurers that have, either by letter or appearance from counsel, have said, "We never wrote insurance in the state of Montana," we've agreed, as you know, to dismiss them, and we've written you a letter with all of the names of the insurers that we know about so far. So those that did not ever write insurance in Montana, we agree to that.

The insurers that wrote insurance in Montana. we feel that we want to at least have the opportunity for some discovery, and we want to see at least an affidavit or some sworn testimony that says that we don't have a claim. So we kind of view them differently. If they had issued insurance in Montana, then we want to be able to look into it a little bit further, and we want to have sworn testimony to get them out.

THE COURT: Sounds to me maybe if we request them to at least submit affidavits, that might do the trick, because those would be under oath rather

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than going through a formal discovery process. 1 2

MR. MURPHY: Right.

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THE COURT: Why don't we plan to do that with those insurers, and I can ask you and the other petitioners' attorneys to identify those for us. That would be a great help. You've been doing that real well, Tom.

MR. JENNINGS: Your Honor, Carrie brings up a good question with respect to the burden of proof. When we submit a motion requesting a dismissal saying that we either never wrote work comp in Montana or that we did write work comp in Montana but never had any claim, are we going to be waiving that issue. conceding that issue?

THE COURT: What do you mean?

MR. JENNINGS: Well, if we say: Here is our proof that we never wrote workers' compensation in Montana or that, while we did write workers' compensation, we never had a claim, are we conceding the issue that Carrie -- are we waiving the issue that Carrie brings up about the burden of proof establishing

22 that the insurer, in fact, did write work comp in 23

Montana and did not have claims? 24

THE COURT: You'll get dismissed out, so the burden of proof really doesn't matter, does it?

1 That will just be client-specific.

> THE COURT: Yeah, it won't affect anything that goes on with the others.

4 MS. GARBER: Your Honor, just so the 5 Court and counsel for the different common fund claims 6 are aware, I just had several phone calls from noncomp 7 attorneys who wanted to know: What do we need to know? What are the rules for the court, and how do we 8

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Page 26

9 file these motions? And I just wanted the Court to put 10 something on the record so that when they come to the

11 website and view those, they have some direction available to them. 12

THE COURT: I think the answer to that is, if they haven't written insurance or they don't have claims or something like that, we're not going to require them to enter the appearance of an attorney. They can furnish that information. If the information isn't sufficient to get them dismissed, we may require them to have an attorney enter an appearance.

20 But, I mean, my philosophy is to get to the 21 bottom of it, get it done and not put so many formal 22 strictures on it that it makes it difficult for 23 everybody. And I know in some cases some of the

24 insurers have been late and, you know, we'll pick them 25

up. I don't want them to be ignoring us, but if they

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MR. JENNINGS: If we bring it back in on this -- Well, no.

THE COURT: You're out, unless somebody finds out something contrary, and if you've filed an affidavit or you've filed something with the Court and it's false, then you're in trouble. So I don't think we really have to worry about the burden of proof.

MR. JENNINGS: Okay.

THE COURT: You know, if some peculiar situation arises where there's some controversy, that somebody doesn't believe an affidavit or doesn't believe the response that's been filed and they've got other information, you can bring it to my attention and we'll investigate and do whatever we have to do to get to the bottom of it.

MR. JENNINGS: Actually, my concern was for the other clients I represent that I don't move to dismiss.

THE COURT: Oh, you mean if you discover later on that they didn't write insurance or --

MR. JENNINGS: No, I've got a group of clients that did write insurance in Montana and might have claims. I don't want to have waived that burden-of-proof argument by providing proof of no claims for my other clients, but I think you're right.

file a late response, we'll deal with it, obviously.

I got the sense from a couple of communications that a lot of people are out there chewing their fingernails down to the quick over these cases trying to figure out, procedurally, what they're supposed to do; and I just reassure them that, you know, procedurally, we're pretty flexible, I think is the good word.

Anything else?

MR. THUESEN: One thing I was wondering, Your Honor, does the Workers' Comp Court provide a list of the insurers that the Court contends that they've summoned? In a case like where we represent multiple insurers, you know, we want to make sure that we're responding for all of our clients that have been summoned.

THE COURT: The answer to that is yes, we actually have some of that. We haven't distributed that, have we? We may have to put this on the Net, the website. I have lists and spreadsheets in Rausch. Flynn and Reesor at this point which indicate who's responded, and also we've compiled a list of who we need to re-serve.

And the ones that we need to re-serve, if we've served them by mail and they don't respond, we're

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going to re-serve them through the Insurance Commissioner. Or if they're self-insured, their registered agent will be served.

We're going to effect legal service using the Rules of Civil Procedure if they don't reply to the mail summons. So we're not going to rely on the mail summons as being effective. Most of the insurers are going to reply to that.

Most of the insurers are familiar with the Workers' Comp Court, and that's the way we do business and it's not a big deal. For those that aren't, we'll make sure they get legally served. That's one thing I'll take up with counsel in these particular cases is how we're going to do that, who is going to be responsible for doing that.

We also have a group where we've had returns of the envelopes with the summons in them, which means they didn't get there, and those insurers and self-insurers will also be served through the Secretary of State if they're self-insureds, and through the Insurance Commissioner if they're insureds.

22 But what I'll do, Ron, is I'll put these 23 lists up on the Internet, and there will be a column 24 here that says "Re-serve," and if it says "No," it's 25 almost always going to correspond to the fact that we global, and it's back in our court. So it appears to me, and I put this in question form, but isn't the next step to serve all of the insurers with the summons in the same fashion we served in Rausch and Ruhd and the other cases?

MR. JONES: Your Honor, we have two options. One is to get the whole list and just send it out, or perhaps have ERD do a check to see what carriers have acknowledged OD claims and thereby limit the summonses that are sent out and the responses that are required.

THE COURT: Carol, you're here. I'm glad you're here. Can we get that list? Would it be comprehensive?

MS. GLEED: What type of list was requested?

THE COURT: Larry is asking if we can generate a list of all insurers who have acknowledged occupational disease claims as being filed against them. Is that going to be comprehensive, going back to 1987?

MS. GLEED: We wouldn't have that information available. Our database didn't distinguish between injuries and ODs.

THE COURT: So the answer is, we'll have

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have a response, almost in every case. So if we don't have a response, we'll probably be re-serving them.

Sometimes we're getting responses where they haven't got service. That's great. It saves us the iob of having to do it. That would be indicated on this list. In Rausch we've picked up several insurers we don't know about who have filed responses.

> So which cases are you concerned with? MR. THUESEN: Well, basically all of

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THE COURT: Okay. We'll get it up on the Internet, and we'll make sure everybody gets a chance. This is a case where you can't default because we've got to affirmatively find out information, so somehow I've got to get everybody in here, by hook or by crook.

Are you keeping track of all this for me. Jackie?

> MS. BOCKMAN: Yes, I am. THE COURT: All right. Let's talk about

21 Schmill. Some of this stuff we've been talking about 22 will probably come up in the context of these next things.

Schmill; the Supreme Court decision has come down. They said there's a common fund and that it's

to serve everybody. Okay.

MS. WALLACE: If there's already an acknowledged list of insurers that didn't write comp in Montana, you know, from some of the other cases. I certainly have no objection to simply not even serving them in this instance.

THE COURT: We'll have to cull through. Part of the problem is we're not going to know what that list is in totality unless we wait awhile in the other cases, but we certainly can weed out those we know about. That's probably a good idea. So weed out nonwriting insurers, basically.

How do you want to go about developing a 13 14 summons? Do you want to try to draft something up? Do you want me to draft something up and circulate it? 15 16 How do you want to do it?

MS. WALLACE: I don't have a problem doing up a draft and circulating it to everybody.

THE COURT: We have some templates that we can follow.

21 MS. GARBER: Your Honor, did the 22 Department of Labor keep track of all insurers who ever 23 had a claim filed with comp through them?

24 THE COURT: Carol? 25

MS. GLEED: Our database does have an

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effective date of when they began writing work comp insurance.

THE COURT: But the question is whether or not you can identify those that actually wrote insurance, or actually had claims, or such that we would be able to rely on that to exclude all our insurers.

MS. GLEED: No. Our new system came into effect in 1995.

THE COURT: All right. So that won't help us either. Good idea though. We never know.

So Laurie will draft it and circulate it, and we'll come up with a summons. The dates to be covered by the summons, the lien says July 1, 1987, through June 22, 2001. Do we have any adjustments to that or is everybody in agreement that those are the lien dates?

MS. WALLACE: I agree.

MR. THUESEN: Why are those the lien

20 dates?

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THE COURT: I think that's because the Schmill decision essentially declares the act, the apportionment, unconstitutional back to 1987. That's really the key date because that's when the Legislature adopted the act, and the rationale was different. The

1 summons, or is this something that will happen as you 2 develop the draft as it goes around?

> THE COURT: We'll focus it as we develop the draft, and my expectation would be that we're only looking for claims in which apportionment has been taken. In all the ones in which apportionment hasn't been taken, we don't have to look at those.

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Another question, we've got Stavenjord sitting in the Supreme Court still. Do we wait a while and try to dove-tail this with Stavenjord? I don't know when it's coming down. I don't have a pipeline that tells me that. So I don't know whether it's imminent or not, but it's been up there for a while.

I would expect that it would be coming down within the near future, or I might at least be able to find out whether or not we can expect it in the near future.

MR. LUCK: As far as we know, it hasn't even been classified yet.

THE COURT: Oh, really?

MR. LUCK: Do you know anything different, Tom?

We've checked a few times, and it has not been classified.

MR. MURPHY: I don't know. I haven't

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rationale changed. June 22, 2001 was what, the date of
my decision?
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MS. WALLACE: Which was affirmed on appeal.

THE COURT: Right. So we'll use those. MR. ATWOOD: By agreeing to those dates, are we waiving any argument in terms of the extent of retroactivity that, in essence, that this does not

THE COURT: No. All we're doing is getting the dates for purposes of the summons, and then the responses can raise any defenses that any of the insurers have.

MR. ATWOOD: Okay. Thank you. THE COURT: It's just a date for purposes of the summons, is all.

MR. ATWOOD: Yeah.

involve closed claims?

THE COURT: But that's a good question, and that's good to get that on the record.

Responsibility for service --

MR. DAVENPORT: Is there going to be any other parameters on the summons other than all claims or, I mean, filed between such-and-such a date. occupational disease claims? Are we looking at trying to focus it down a little bit more closely on the

asked that question.

THE COURT: Jackie, would you make a note, and maybe I can find out what the status of it is, whether it's been classified or what's going on with it?

Well, if it hasn't been classified, then probably, you know, unless everybody wants to wait, we might be waiting for a while.

When Schmill was classified, how long did it take before the decision came down?

MR. LUCK: Your Honor, my recollection was it was pretty fast. Schmill was determined pretty quickly, wasn't it?

MS. WALLACE: Well, that's a relative term. I don't recall. Must have been about nine months. I don't remember.

17 THE COURT: Well, I think, short of 18 getting information that it's coming shortly, I think 19 probably we'll just go ahead with this summons and do 20 it separately and --

21 MR. LUCK: It was submitted on April 20th 22 and decided on June 7th.

THE COURT: So that was pretty quick. MR. HAWKINS: Relatively speaking. MR. PALMER: "Submitted" makes it sound

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costs.

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like something the claimants or the parties did, and 2 "submitted" does not mean that. 3

THE COURT: Well, submitted in the case of a Montana Supreme Court case would mean that they classified it as being submitted on briefs.

MR. PALMER: The classification date. THE COURT: Right, it would be

classication date. MR. PALMER: And it hasn't been

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classified yet for Stavenjord; is that right? THE COURT: Apparently, they're not aware if it has.

MR. HARRINGTON: Your Honor, as of two weeks ago, it had not been classified.

THE COURT: Okay. So anyway, we won't wait. We'll proceed.

Next question: Who is responsible for assembling and mailing all of this stuff out? We've been doing it up to this point in time, and it's a fairly significant job on our staff and our resources, and I can tell you that my staff has been scurrying around preparing these spreadsheets, for example, to track who needs to be re-served, for example, who hasn't been served, and tracking who the attorneys are

in the case and whether responses have been filed.

2 THE COURT: Well, with the way our budget 3 works, that's tough to do. We can pass on the 4 out-of-pocket expenses, but recouping employee-time

costs and things like that, it's probably impossible. The way the state budget process operates, I can't imagine even talking about it.

8 MR. FLOCH: Your Honor, the noncomp 9 attorney in here; I mean, in general litigation, I get 10 the summons issued by the Court, and it's my responsibility to send it out if I'm representing a 11 plaintiff or a claimant. I don't know if that bears 12 13 here. I mean, the Court can certainly issue the 14 summons as it typically does, and it should fall under 15 the responsibility of the claimant's attorney.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, it's going to appear that it comes from the Court anyway.

MS. SWINGLEY: I just wanted to add, the UEF has been serving uninsured employers with summonses for years since the Court established that rule. During my time at the UEF, there was never any question about whether they were served. So I don't -- I mean,

23 that's a burden that's been on UEF. 24 THE COURT: Those cases, though, are

where we're ordering personal service, so there's a

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It's taking a great deal of administrative time; and Jackie, and I think Clara, both, have been putting in extra hours and working some weekends doing it. I'm just wondering if we can't kick that back, and we can certainly do the summons and provide the -- Are we doing envelopes or just doing labels?

MS. BOCKMAN: We had to do labels on the last one because it was too big for an envelope.

THE COURT: We could provide either envelopes or whatever. Can you absorb that, Laurie, in the case of Schmill?

MS. WALLACE: Well, if you tell us we 13 have to, we will.

14 THE COURT: Do you have any big 15 objections to doing it? Are there any particular 16 problems in having you do it as opposed to the Court 17 doing it?

MR. MURPHY: If the Court does it, there's no question that it got done. If counsel does it, you might have an insurer that questions whether it was done properly. So we took more confidence in the fact that the Court did it. Maybe we could pay for some of the administrative time to do it. We paid for the mailing in Reesor, and I'm happy to do that. Maybe we should participate in some of the administrative

sheriff that's going out or --

2 MS. SWINGLEY: Well, I mean, in this case 3 you're not, so it's even less of a burden, it seems to 4 5

THE COURT: If they don't respond by mail to us, we're going to re-serve them anyway. So if they don't respond to the mail summons, they'll get formally re-served anyway. Well, we'll talk about it, but unless we have, you know, some extra time here, we may put that burden back on the claimant's attorneys to have their secretarial staff do the folding and the stuffing of the envelopes and putting the postage on it.

One other question we had is in some of these cases, insurers haven't responded to the mail. Have we identified the ones that didn't respond? Well, we have, because at least in some of the cases of Rausch and Flynn -- Have we done it in Flynn yet, re-served them through the Insurance Commissioner?

MS. BOCKMAN: I don't have it handy, but we did in Reesor, Rausch and Flynn.

21 22 THE COURT: In Reesor, Rausch and Flynn 23 we've already served the Secretary of State for the 24 self-insureds who didn't respond to mail and also the Insurance Commissioner for the insureds that didn't

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respond to mail, and I wonder if we might not just want to go ahead and serve those insurers through the Insurance Commissioner and Secretary of State rather than even wasting the envelope on those. What do you think? Or we can mail them and wait and then do it afterwards too.

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MR. PALMER: In the Civil Procedure Rules there is a process where you can send service out by mail. If they don't knowledge it, then it shifts the burden to them. If something like that was incorporated right from the Rules of Procedure, it might make them more interested in responding the first time out, as well, since you've gone through another process in the Flynn matter, in Schmill they might be more responsive.

But they'd probably be more responsive yet if there was some notice in there that you can either respond to this or get served; but if you get served later, you may have to pay for it yourself, if you don't respond to the mailing.

THE COURT: Do the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that if you don't respond, you have to pay for the cost of service? We can certainly add that, although we don't have a similar rule. I wonder if it would hold water.

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know, a few insurers. When we have a large volume, she didn't know how that was going to work out.

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3 THE COURT: Do they pass on any sort of 4 fee to the insurers when they serve it?

MS. BOCKMAN: I don't think so. I think that would be our burden.

THE COURT: Let's go back to that idea. Should we put in an acknowledgment of service and see if that helps? My fear is they might ignore that, it might give them impetus to ignore it. I don't know why they would do that if they would respond to the summons without having it.

MS. POLLACK: Your Honor, I would object to having to pay where we never received it in the first place.

15 16 THE COURT: Well, yeah, you're not going 17 to have to pay anything if you haven't received it, 18 obviously. And if we mail it out, you don't have to 19 pay anything anyway, as long as you get it and you 20 reply. The only provision in the Rules of Civil 21 Procedure is, if you get it and you can acknowledge and 22 you don't, then there's a rule in Montana that says 23 that if they have to serve you through other means, 24 then you have to pay for the cost of service. So if 25 you don't get it in the first place, I don't think it's

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MR. JENNINGS: Your Honor, there are some -- many that I've run across that it wasn't a matter of their decision not to respond. They just never got anything, and I don't know if it's due to bad addresses or what, but some of my people said. I mean. they never got anything.

THE COURT: The bad addresses come back to us and then we re-serve.

MR. JENNINGS: Okay. So you've identified those.

MS. POLLACK: Your Honor, my company has received some summonses in which we were named and did not receive others in which we were named.

THE COURT: Oh, that's interesting.

MS. POLLACK: We found out about one from a third party, and I don't know about the other ones that we haven't gotten.

THE COURT: What happens when we serve the Insurance Commissioner? We have to pay them something; am I right, Jackie?

MS. BOCKMAN: They do have a fee, but she actually --

THE COURT: Is it waived for us?

MS. BOCKMAN: -- waived it for us, but that was with Rausch because there was only 50, you a big deal.

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MS. POLLACK: Okay. We would have the opportunity to put that forward, I understand, then.

THE COURT: Yeah, and we've got you on our list at this point for your insurer. We can make sure that you get it. We'll send a copy.

That's the other thing we can do, is send copies to anybody who has responded who's got a representative. Why can't we do that as well?

MR. HERINGER: They'd have to have the authority to accept that service. Maybe what can help save some time, I mean, as this is moving along, counsel is identifying who they represent, and maybe they can affirmatively say, "I will have authority for these people to," you know, "accept service." That may cut down on some of this. But as I sit here today, I don't have authority from the people that I represent that I can say I can accept service on some of these things.

19 20 THE COURT: I think we have e-mail addresses for everybody who has appeared or responded, 21 22 so we can send these out, but we can also send a copy 23 to them with a cover e-mail saying that we're also copying them, that this has been sent by mail to the official address of the insurer, something along that

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line, and indicate to them if they can basically cut through all of that and respond, it would be helpful.

I think maybe that would be the way to do that; and then if you get authority, that's fine. I mean, at least you know it's being served on the client that you have in other cases.

MR. HERINGER: Because we've been served on Rausch, K-Mart's been served on Rausch, but not on Flynn. I asked, "Have you received this?" I know they're coming down the pike, but I want to know if they've been done properly or if they've gotten it, and they keep me up to date with what they've got and what they have not received.

THE COURT: One thing we might be able to do is to compare the responses in the cases that we've already got going to see if we've got a response by a particular insurer or self-insured in one case and not the other; and then if we do, let the representative in the one case know that we haven't gotten a response and it was served on them, and maybe they can follow up. That might cut through some of that too.

So you might want to do that in a case that you -- I think you would have -- I think Flynn was basically universal. That summons was universal, pretty much, so it should have been sent to K-Mart as

1 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OVERTURF: Judge, if we're going to address that issue in the Ruhd-Rausch case, will other counsel have the ability to brief that?

THE COURT: Absolutely. Anybody who wants to brief anything in any of these cases, I welcome it.

MR. FEEBACK: Your Honor, it occurs to me, having listened to your discussion about the service and the possibility of falling through the cracks, as it were, that some of us may be implicated in some of these other cases and be completely unaware of it.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FEEBACK: Is there some way for counsel to find out for the client?

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, what we'll do is we'll post -- at least in the cases where we made service, we'll post the list of responses, and I think it's alphabetical; am I right?

MS. BOCKMAN: It is.

THE COURT: Is it in Excel?

MS. BOCKMAN: Flynn and Reesor are Excel spreadsheets. Rausch is Access program.

THE COURT: We can also PDF it too.

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well.

MR. HERINGER: Well, I asked, "Have you got it?" and they said "No."

THE COURT: Maybe we could send an e-mail in those cases where we've identified people like you, asking you if you can accept service on their behalf so we don't have to serve them through the Secretary of State -- or through the Insurance -- well, they would be through the Secretary of State.

All right, a closed-case issue raised by Liberty. I think the question is if the insurer has unilaterally closed the case for not paying benefits or something like that and sent the file to storage, does that constitute a closed case for the purposes of Schmill and such that we can exclude those cases? I have a feeling I already know the answer to that question, but we're going to need to address it in one of these cases that's been raised.

Do we need to address it in this case at this point? It looks to me like it's going to be presented in Rausch; am I right?

MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: How about if we just resolve that issue in that case?

MR. JONES: That's agreeable to me.

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1 MS. BOCKMAN: Yeah, but the summonses are 2 on the Web with the names listed.

MR. DAVENPORT: I can help them.

Technique (phonetic) is one of our clients, so we can help them out with knowing what they've been served on and what they haven't.

THE COURT: Okay, but those lists will tell you. If you know who your client is, you can go down the alphabetical list. We'll put the spreadsheets both in Excel and also PDF. So if you don't have Excel, you'll still be able to see the spreadsheet. That should make it pretty easy.

MR. ATWOOD: Judge, if you're going to brief the closed-case issue in Rausch, neither of the clients that I represent on these issues have cases, or at least, well, neither of them have been served, and I know at least one of them doesn't have any cases that

are applicable there.

What's the best way for us to appear if we want to file a brief on that issue? Just file a notice of appearance?

THE COURT: I think that would be

THE COURT: I think that would be sufficient, or just file your belief and I'll treat it as a notice of appearance. For the purposes of filing a brief, treat it as an amicus brief.

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MR. ATWOOD: Okay. I guess that's probably more proper under the circumstances.

MR. FLOCH: Not to raise a more complicating issue, but it appears that some insurers have been appearing just through their president or other corporate designee, and they have not appeared through counsel. I just didn't know if that issue had been addressed. It doesn't necessarily affect anybody that's representing any current insureds, but they can't appear in this proceeding without Montana counsel, can they?

THE COURT: If they're going to brief something, you're right. If they're going to raise legal issues, you're right. If they're appearing and basically indicating that they don't have any case, for our purposes of our dismissing them out, I'm not going to force them to get a Montana attorney at this time, because we can deal with that, with the petitioner's attorney, and the Court can deal with that.

If they're responding by furnishing the information and complying with the summons which says, "Furnish this information and identify them," they don't need an attorney because it's basically a compliance procedure.

If they're going to raise legal issues and

1 you know, assuming they're not dismissed out, then,2 yes, they do need an attorney.

3 MR. FLOCH: I agree.

THE COURT: I suppose if anybody gets in trouble, it will be me, but I think we're okay.

MR. HAWKINS: Your Honor, I don't want to take us too far down this particular path. I've done some research on it, though, and if the attorney is making an appearance in Montana and if that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, the Court's ruling on the matter is irrelevant.

No offense, sir, but the Court can say it's permissible for you to make an appearance, but if it's later deemed to be the practice of law, the Court condoning the activity is irrelevant to the attorney's prosecution. So attorneys appearing from out of state in this forum, they're doing so at their own risk.

THE COURT: The question is whether or not we're going to treat them as appearance, and maybe I need an opinion on that.

MR. HAWKINS: It's not going to make any difference unless somebody makes a complaint.

THE COURT: I'm certainly not treating those as formal appearances of counsel, for sure, of anybody that's replying out of state, and particularly

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start filing briefs, you're absolutely right, they need an attorney, and we'll request that they do that. Do you think there's a problem in our handling it in that way?

MR. FLOCH: The youngest guy in the room? I mean, no, I don't. It is concerning to me that they haven't formally appeared through counsel, and I mean, I've seen some of the letters on the web page. It's very informative. I think I've seen some of them that have been stamped as filed. So is that letter a formal appearance on behalf of the insurer, and if so, then --

THE COURT: We're treating them -- We're filing everything that comes in, so we're making it a part of the docket so it's part of the official record.

But, you know, for insurers who aren't out there raising legal issues, as to the process, they're either going to comply, or if they're not subject to the process, letting us know that.

I don't want to force all of those people to get attorneys and go through all that hassle, you know. If they're going to make a legal appearance and they're going to make legal argument and be involved in some way in that, other than in the compliance forum,

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replying by letter.

MR. CADWALLADER: My recollection is that
the Montana Bar Association has provided a formal legal
opinion that an attorney has an obligation to report
the unauthorized practice of law if the attorney
becomes aware of an instance.

THE COURT: Okav.

MS. POLLACH: Your Honor, if you're an attorney, aren't you just appearing pro se?

MR. FLOCH: You can't appear pro se if you're a corporation.

THE COURT: That's correct, under Montana

13 law.

MS. POLLACH: Pro se, but responding as an entity rather than as a practicing attorney.

THE COURT: At least in Montana, the rule is a corporation can only appear through counsel. But don't worry about it right now. If anybody is messed up on it, it is I, and I will take the responsibility for it. But I will check and see if there's any

problem with the procedure that we're following. I'll
 have to figure out where to check.
 MR. HUNT: I'm actually the former

chairman of the Commission on Unauthorized Practice, and we've somewhat dealt with this, and you can do a

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pro hac vice admission. That's generally done with counsel in the same case, but you may be able to fashion something along those lines.

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THE COURT: Yeah. That won't help with respect to the companies that are replying through corporate officers; but, again, they're just furnishing information. They're just basically complying. I don't know.

MR. LUCK: Your Honor, seems like the carriers that this would relate to will end up spending more in attorney fees than they have in terms of benefits. We need to be aware of that. There's so many people that are just hangers-on in terms of these large lists.

THE COURT: I absolutely agree with you. That's why I want to handle it. A lot of these people are going to be doing administrative tasks, finding out the claimants for us, in which case it's a nonadversarial proceeding, as far as they're concerned. It's an enforcement proceduring, so it's really no different than somebody having property out there that you're proceeding against the property.

And with respect to those that are replying because they represent insurers that aren't involved and haven't written insurance and whatever else, you're so many insurers in this case, and ultimately we're going to be dealing with a bunch of claimants.

We're wondering about how we're going to track this information, and I sort of compiled a quick list of what I thought -- information that we need to be tracking and information that we're going to need at the court level, which included the names of the insurers who can be dismissed, and actually we're tracking that. That ultimately will turn out to be who has been dismissed. Insurers who need to be re-served: and, again, we've got that tracked at this point in the cases that are pending.

"The legal defenses raised by each insurer," although I've tracked that to some extent. Ultimately we'll be tracking claimants who are entitled to benefits, and that's one that I'm thinking that at least the initial responsibility ought to be on the counsel, on counsel for the claimants and counsel for the individual insurers who are involved in that rather than the Court trying to track all of that information.

Historically we've gotten the lists -- we've ultimately gotten the list, the State Fund, in Muir and in Broeker, and I think even in Rausch, it's provided the list of who's been paid, which we've

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right, I mean, they're going to go out, and they're providing us with information that lets us dismiss them out. To make a big deal out of it just doesn't make a lot of sense to me, but I suppose we can cut the sushi

pretty thin, in Leo's words.

I don't know how thin the Commission on Unauthorized Practice would be on something like that, so I have a feeling I'll go seek some advisory opinion or something to try to keep my nose clean and everybody else's noses clean.

MR. LUCK: I'm not speaking out against attorney fees, Your Honor, just unnecessary ones.

THE COURT: You're right. I agree. Attorneys have as much work as they need. They don't need the extra hassle. That's why we have these meetings, so new little things can pop up that we can address. That's a legitimate concern, and I appreciate it. I think we ought to cover it and protect everybody. I don't want anybody hanging out there.

Okay, "Tracking procedure. See Agenda 8 on Reesor." I reorganized this. Tom Murphy has been doing tracking of the responses and has provided us information, and we've sort of used some of that information and done some of our own tracking. The tracking becomes significant because we're dealing with Page 54

maintained in case there were any questions about it. But I certainly don't go through that and look at it 3 and double-check it, and hopefully I won't have to do 4 it in these cases.

So my question is sort of a general one. Maybe Tom can tell everybody what he's doing as far as tracking and what he anticipates, and also maybe Lon can tell us what they're doing in Rausch, and I have questions about Rausch, too, specifically.

Tom, what are you doing? How are you handling it?

MR. MURPHY: We have an Excel spreadsheet which we track the number of cases where there was an appearance by an insurance company representative. whether it be an attorney or president or some other person that had the ability to say whether they had issued insurance in Montana. For those that said that they didn't, we agreed to dismiss without prejudice, as we already covered.

For those that appeared with counsel, we have -- there's 196 of them, by the way, that we've tracked so far. We listed that, when they appeared, and whether they filed any motions. We haven't paid too much attention to what their defenses are, maybe because claimant's counsel is too cynical, you know,

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they defend on too many defenses.

So we've just tracked who their attorney was, when he or she appeared, and obviously we're going to start another list as to each insurance company when we start identifying claimants under that company's umbrella. So that's our plan.

We sent that to the Court. We can e-mail that to anybody that wants it, although I understand the Court is now going to post it on the website, so that's great.

THE COURT: Right, we've got actually -MR. MURPHY: I have 264 appearances. How
many are on the summons? That's what I've been trying
to ask.

THE COURT: 650.

MR. MURPHY: Is there 650? I thought we counted that once, but I have not sat down and --

THE COURT: Which one is this? Reesor?

MR. MURPHY: Reesor.

THE COURT: We had 276 responses out of

637 as of July 12th of 2005.

MR. MURPHY: So you have 12 more than I did, that I haven't seen. That's something we're going to have to figure out too.

THE COURT: Well, I think maybe in these

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1 Court want the insurers to proceed with Schmill-type 2 demands that they're receiving now that the Schmill II 3 decision has been issued?

THE COURT: Elaborate. What kind of demands are you receiving?

MR. HARRINGTON: For payment of benefits that were apportioned. They want their Schmill benefits paid, and there hasn't been a summons issued yet. How do you want us to handle those?

THE COURT: As to the insurers that you represent, how should they handle them?

MR. HARRINGTON: Do we want to have a stay issued until the summons goes out and all the insurers come in and we go through the process of identifying the claimants?

THE COURT: My suggestion would be that if you look at it and they're entitled to the benefits and there aren't any legal defenses that you want to raise to it, would be to go ahead and pay them, but withhold the lien. I would authorize that rather than making them wait. I mean, once they've identified themselves, and you can identify them as being persons entitled to the benefits, unless you have -- I mean, if you have legal defenses, then we'll have to sort them out in the Schmill case, although I'm not sure how much

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individual cases I'm going to be dealing with a lot of the same counsel, and we can coordinate in some fashion and try to reduce as much duplication of effort as we possibly can. Once we've got this going, this will be a little bit easier to maintain, now that we've got it.

At least as far as the insurer information and responses, it looks like we're going to be pretty much up to speed. There may be some duplication, but to the extent that you can track it, especially the responses where we're going to be dismissing people out, that's going to help.

Does anybody else want to talk about tracking at all? Anything else?

Anybody want to talk about anything else on Schmill? Is there anything else on Schmill that we have to do at this point? Clara?

MS. WILSON: Just to let you know, Stavenjord was briefed as of April 25th, but it has not been classified.

THE COURT: So it's still sitting up
there. So that probably reaffirms what we thought in
the first place. We ought to just go ahead. Anything
else on Schmill?

MR. HARRINGTON: Your Honor, how does the

is left of legal defenses in Schmill in light of that
 Supreme Court decision. I don't think there's a whole
 heck of a lot left there.

So my suggestion would be, unless you have a bona fide, serious, legal defense and you know that the benefits are due, would be to pay them. And if you want an order from me to authorize the withholding, draft one up and we'll do it. I could do a blanket one for that.

MR. OVERTURF: Would you suggest withholding 20 percent for the attorney fee, given that we haven't had any kind of attorney-fee hearing yet?

THE COURT: What's the lien claim?

MS. WALLACE: It's 25.

THE COURT: I'll authorize you to

withhold 25 percent.MR. DAVE

MR. DAVENPORT: I suppose that Larry — or Rex has got the cases, the attorney who is demanding payment of the benefits. So there's two attorneys involved, presumably Larry and Rex. I just go ahead and deduct 25 percent and pay the remainder to Rex? I mean, this is a, you know. . .

THE COURT: Oh, assuming it's Rex's client?

MR. DAVENPORT: Right.

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THE COURT: I think that's right.
MR. DAVENPORT: No matter how loud Rex

yells.

THE COURT: No matter how loud Rex yells, but he won't yell, because he knows these things.

MR. DAVENPORT: A theoretical question, of course.

THE COURT: So I need to issue a standing order on this. Tom, do you want to try to draft something up for me?

MR. HARRINGTON: Absolutely. Should I include in there that 25 percent is outrageous?

THE COURT: You can if you like, but I'm not sure it will get in the order.

MR. HARRINGTON: As long as the record reflects there was some sarcasm in that comment, it will be okay.

THE COURT: Anybody who reads a transcript of these proceedings and thinks that everything we say is serious needs to come to one of these.

Let's move on to Reesor. The first question is really the question we had before, I raised before, whether or not we should put the onus on the petitioner's attorney for reservice.

1 here, the reservice.

THE COURT: We'll plan on doing Reesor unless we think we need help. We'll try to develop that list.

MR. HARRINGTON: Your Honor while you

MR. HARRINGTON: Your Honor, while you're talking about reservice of Reesor, we saw that Skaggs was listed as one of the companies that hasn't responded. They're part of the Albertson's group, and if they were left out of our response to summons, that was a mistake. I'll double-check that, but we are representing them as part of the Albertson's group, so you won't need to re-serve them.

THE COURT: Okay. Got that? MS. BOCKMAN: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: Here's a biggy for everybody: What do we do with insurers who we do get properly served and they still don't respond? Has anybody thought about that, or maybe that's something that you want to go home and think about. I don't know the answer to that. I mean, the Court has all sorts of powers, but we're going to have to figure out some sort of plan to proceed as to those insurers who just ignore us.

MR. HUNT: You can give a liquidated damages penalty of 100 claimants or something like

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I wonder, this is where we're going to have to re-serve the Insurance Commissioner. We've sort of got that set up, don't we?

MS. BOCKMAN: Yes. We've only re-served the ones that the envelopes were returned in Reesor as undeliverable. We have not sent them off. Oh, no, we did send them. That's right, we sent them over to the Insurance Commissioner and we haven't heard back from them, so Reesor is underway.

THE COURT: So we've taken care of the ones that have been served that haven't replied and also the ones we had return mail, all of those have gone to the Insurance Commissioner?

MS. BOCKMAN: Actually, I think it's just the return mail. We'll have to go through the list again to see if they haven't responded and get another list. I misspoke.

THE COURT: Is there going to be any big benefit to us as far as the ones that have been served that haven't replied, shipping that over and having the claimants' attorneys doing that instead of us doing it? What can we have them do that will help us?

MS. JACKIE: In Reesor I don't know that it's going to help us that much. I don't think that that list will be that long. We can probably do Reesor

1 that.

THE COURT: How would that work?

Okay, I suspect nobody is prepared to address it, but put that in your notes and think about that, because I think we're going to have to cross that bridge.

MR. MURPHY: I think, Judge, that we should make sure we get service, which you are ensuring. Once we do have proper service, if a party doesn't appear, then I think that we've done everything we can for now. You might have to address sanctions against that company later, but it doesn't, you know, there's no time limit on when you can do that. We could get on with the case and then address those issues as we're doing the case itself, but we're going to be speaking about your sanction power.

to be speaking about your sanction power.
 THE COURT: Which I always am reluctant
 to use. I'd rather have compliance than be issuing
 sanctions. Yeah, I agree, there's no reason to hold up
 anything else. We can pick them up along the way.
 It's something I think we need to be thinking about.
 Once we've got all these summonses re-served and we see

there are a bunch of insurers out there that still
haven't replied, we'll have to deal with it in some

25 fashion.

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MR. MURPHY: Right.

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THE COURT: No. 3 on Reesor, I think we've already discussed. No. 4 is, "What issues remain for resolution in Reesor in light of Schmill II?" I had the pleasure of using our Internet site with all our docket on it and going through the responses to try to identify all of the issues that have been raised, and I'm through "T." What is that, about 20 of them?

I guess when I look at some of these, I suspect that some of these really aren't very serious, and what I want to try to do is, number one, find out if there are any other issues out there in Reesor, and I'll also want to do the same thing in these other cases once we get going on them.

Are there any other issues out there? Then I think what we want to do is what we've done in other cases, and that is brief the issues, but I want to initially sort the chaff out from the real issues. I'm not sure how to do that.

I thought about maybe requiring a statement from all attorneys who raised issues saying, "We really mean to assert these issues. These are the issues we really mean to assert and we want to brief them." or we could just set a briefing schedule and they can set out the issues; and the ones that they brief, we'll

1 we've got service on them.

> So my thought would be that if we establish it, it would be far enough in advance that they could respond and still meet whatever deadlines we put on doing this process rather than -- I mean, we can wait. The other option would be just to wait until that date is expired, have another conference or do something else, but I'd rather resolve it here rather than organizing another conference to discuss it. I think we ought to figure out a strategy for this now, but make it long enough in advance that they get served and have an opportunity to respond. Does that make sense?

MR. MURPHY: Judge, I think that the parties could use your agenda here that you've put out and this list from (a) to (t) as the issues identified. I think the Court could allow parties an additional five days to identify additional defenses that need briefing, and then I think that the Court could instruct the parties as to which issues the Court wants briefing on, because you have decided many, if not most of these defenses raised, like the contract issue, the question about whether the failure to plead common fund fees. That's now been briefed at the Supreme Court and decided in the Schmill II case. So I think that a good way to do it would be

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consider. The ones they don't brief we can consider abandoned.

Anyway, those are the thoughts going through my mind at this point in time, is whether or not we should try to reduce the issues and then order the issues that are serious ones, or that counsel believe are serious ones, develop that list and then order briefing, or just order briefs and whatever issues are raised in those briefs are responded to and then I decide it. I mean, there are two different ways of handling it; and there might be a third way, I don't know.

MR. LUCK: My first question is whether we want to do that, narrow anything or make any decisions in relation to issues until you finalize service. That's one of the other numbers there. I know that's one of the things you wanted to talk about. But if you're still in the process of getting the word to all the insurers to make an appearance, is it premature to limit issues or to initiate the briefing?

THE COURT: Well, I think we can start that process, because I think that process - by the time that process is completed, the time for formal responding will be at an end, and if they haven't formally responded, that's their tough luck, as long as Page 66

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if the Court just told the parties what issues you want briefing on.

THE COURT: Yeah, but then I may get in an argument about whether or not issues that I've foreclosed briefing on or not asked briefing on should in fact be briefed.

I'd sort of rather have counsel tell me which ones they're willing to give up at this point. If they want to brief them, I'm sort of hesitant to cut them off and say they can't brief them, even though I think I may know the answer, and I think the answers are clear from the Supreme Court decisions.

MR. MARTELLO: Judge, I think that the parties should be able to brief those issues that they think are important, and you're not going to get agreement, likely, from all the defendants as to which issues should be dropped and which issues should be briefed. And I think for those that you have already made your determination, you can just go through and address and indicate in your decision that this has already been determined and cite the appropriate authority for.

But I think that necessarily each defendant has to have the ability to raise the issues they think are germane to the case, and for those issues that they

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don't want to raise, then they've abandoned them. I don't know that you can get a list. Otherwise, you'll get a list that's going to be, I think, incredibly long in order to make sure that every possible contingency is covered.

THE COURT: It seems to me that whatever is raised needs to be raised in the response in the first instance, so the responses are going to set it out, unless I mean, we can add to that up to a certain point. So maybe what I need to do is issue a deadline for identifying any other issues not already contained in the responses. I think that would be the way to do it, and do that — issue that deadline, which would be beyond the deadline for the responses once we get the new service, so why don't I do that.

Then after that, this would be basically the master list, again, subject to my being human and maybe misstating the defenses in there or missing some, because I didn't look at every single answer. I figured if Brad filed an answer in one case, his answer in the next case was going to contain the same defenses. I think that's a pretty safe assumption, but it's not a perfect assumption.

So I think we could develop that list and have that provided to everyone so everybody would have

MS. WALLACE: But that doesn't answer my question. Once they brief them, then the claimant's attorney has to respond to all of them?

THE COURT: Well, to the extent you think it's necessary, to the ones that they've briefed.

MS. WALLACE: Right.

THE COURT: To the extent you think is necessary.

MR. MURPHY: Judge, could claimants' counsel file one master response to these issues so that we are not writing 240 briefs on the same --

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. MURPHY: I think that's what Laurie is maybe getting at there.

THE COURT: Oh, absolutely. You can just file a single brief responsive, as long as you've covered the issues that are raised in the other briefs.

Same thing for the insurers. Each insurer that you represent doesn't have to file a separate brief. You can file a consolidated brief.

MS. GILCREST: Your Honor, if one insurer's attorney files a brief on five of those subjects, five of those defenses, then they essentially preserve those defenses for each of their clients; but

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an opportunity, including the attorneys who want to appear amici in any particular case, to brief the issues, the common issues.

But also if there's something in one of the responses or one of the additional -- well, it would be in one of the responses that's raised that I didn't particularly pick up, they could still put that in their brief. So set a briefing deadline, issue that list of cases, being understood that if there are other issues out there or responses, that they can be briefed; and also make it clear that if they don't brief it, it's deemed abandoned, and set a deadline, a schedule for that.

MS. WALLACE: Does that mean, Your Honor, that the defendants can pick and choose and brief a couple of the issues, and then the claimants' attorneys have to respond to every single one of them?

THE COURT: No. What I'm saying is since these are defenses, they would brief the issues that they thought had merit, and if they don't brief it, I'm going to deem it abandoned, and I'll issue an order to that effect.

Does that give any of the insurers' attorneys heartburn? I assume that if you think it's a serious defense, you'll brief it. if another counsel for a different insurer does not

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2 file a brief on those defenses, then they're, in effect, waiving those defenses for their client?

THE COURT: I think whatever defenses are waived, whatever I rule on that is going to be for the whole kit and caboodle. It will be applicable to everything that goes on in the case.

MS. GILCREST: So if you rule in Brad Luck's favor on one of these particular defenses, that would be applicable to every response?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HERINGER: What if somebody has already responded to the summons, but there's these defenses out there? I mean, have we waived it? And that goes along with what she's saying. What I've done in other cases is Brad has filed a brief, I incorporate, by reference, anything he says, and it's about a one-page brief for me.

Of course, Brad does such good work, that's what you do all the time, you know. But I also have clients that have already sent in information in response to summonses, and they waived all those defenses.

THE COURT: Some insurers aren't going to get involved in the legal hassle. They'll produce the

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information and pay the claimants. Essentially they're not going to do those defenses. If they're going down that road, then they're going down that road.

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So, you know, if that's the way you respond and you haven't responded by defending, I'm going to hold you to that. It may make sense to do that for many insurers. It may be more costly and time-consuming and more aggravating to try to raise legal defenses, even if you think you have them. Or you may evaluate it and think you don't have legal defenses and not want to do it.

My reply to that is, if the response is in. we're going to identify the claimants and pay them. I plan to hold you to that unless you want to move to amend and try to raise additional defenses, and then you'll have to make a motion.

MR. HERINGER: I'd like to first answer what you said, if you rule in favor of a defense, it applies to everybody. I think if you go to the second way you said, everybody is going to start filing a lot of motions because they're -- they don't want them deemed waived, you know, like...

THE COURT: It's going to apply to -- I think, the way I'm envisioning it, it will apply to everyone who is defending on legal grounds against the compliance.

MR. OVERTURF: Aren't we looking for one rule of law that applies to everybody here? I mean, if you rule that there is a certain defense in a case, that precludes payment to some or all of the claimants, doesn't that apply to everybody?

THE COURT: No, not necessarily. Basically, you can waive it. I mean, for example, in Flynn, the State Fund entered into an agreement to go ahead and pay the Flynn benefits, and that didn't go to the Supreme Court, but it came back, and now we may have some defenses in Flynn where they're arguing that it doesn't create a common fund.

So basically you've agreed to waive those defenses and proceed to pay them. Individual insurers can decide to do that, and it may be a better route than defending against it. But then there's a bunch of these others out here who are going to resist it. So I don't think all insurers are in the same boat.

MR. MURPHY: Judge, I agree with you. We fully expect to see a number of small insurers with one or two claims come to us and say, "We only have one claim. We'd like to resolve the matter and be out of this case," and we're expecting to be contacted by a number of insureds' companies in that regard. Then

application of the common fund, but those who have not defended on legal grounds, who have basically responded that, "Here are our claimants and we will pay them,"

3 4 they're in a different situation. They're different 5

from those that are trying to defend against the

application. So that's how I envision it.

So, for example, if you filed and said, "No, we don't owe anything because we have legal defenses," and you've got two legal defenses raised, there's two ways I can handle that. Number one is just limit you to those legal defenses. Brad has raised two other legal defenses. If I rule in his favor on those, they don't apply to you. So I could say, "You're Stuck." That would be one way to handle it. "You don't get the

15 benefit of Brad's defenses," or I can say, "We'll look 16 at these defenses jointly," to anybody who is arguing

17 they don't have to pay Schmill benefits, they don't 18 have to pay benefits to those claimants who have been

19 apportioned, they don't have to pick those benefits

20 up. Anybody who has said, "We don't have to do that

21 because we have legal defenses," just basically pool 22 all the defenses and decide them all jointly and have

23 it apply to everybody who has raised defenses, but not

to the insurers who have replied. We're going to 24

25 identify them and we're not going to resist they're out and they don't have to pay these expenses.

THE COURT: Well, the other thing is the legal analysis on behalf of particular insurers may be different. I mean, some insurers may conclude that there isn't -- that resistance is futile, and others may think that it's not.

MR. FLOCH: I mean, that's a concern that I raised with respect to insurers who are, I guess, complying with what you said is a nonadversarial process. If they're simply saying, "We're going to go look at our records and see if we do have any of these types of claims under a variety of these different common fund cases," is that a tacit admission that they're willing to pay those claims, and are they waiving legal defenses down the road?

THE COURT: Well, I think they are unless they're filing a response raising a legal defense. That's the way that I would treat them, unless I'm in error in doing that. And I think if they want to raise those, they need to file something -- then they need an attorney and they need to be filing something.

22 MR. FLOCH: Well, I guess that's the 23 concern I have, that when you phrase it like this, that 24 it's a nonadversarial compliance process, that there may be no understanding or a meeting of the minds that

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we're going to pay these claims or we've waived our defenses. I mean, it's just an issue, and I don't mean to complicate it.

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time.

THE COURT: Well, I think an insurer who gets a notice and a summons like this who wants to raise a legal defense to doing it would do so rather than providing the information and go forward on that basis. I'm treating those as indicating they're in compliance. If they don't intend that, then it's - if it's not a compliance process to them, it becomes adversarial, but they need to make it adversarial by filing some sort of response in which they raise those defenses.

MR. FEEBACK: What, procedurally, would be the way that you go about that?

THE COURT: File an answer in which you raise defenses.

MR. FEEBACK: When I responded on behalf of Cominco, my understanding at that time was this was being delayed until, I can't remember the date, but in my case, I think it was sometime in August, for the company to figure out just exactly where they sat with respect to the allegations in the complaint.

THE COURT: So you've got an extension of

1 good example. That case was settled and resolved on 2 terms that were worked out between the parties, and it

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3 seems like the better rule would be absent a

4 settlement, any carrier is only responsible to follow

5 the single rule of law as finally determined by the

6 Court, whether they come in and it's economically sound

7 for them to defend or not. Ultimately there's one rule 8

of law.

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THE COURT: I know, and the problem is. they said there's a common fund, and I suspect a lot of these defenses are not going to go very far. I read these common fund cases where they see a common fund as being pretty darned clear, and I look at this list of 20-some-odd defenses here, and I don't think most of those defenses are going to go anywhere, because I think you're absolutely right, there is one rule of law. The Supreme Court has adopted that rule of law, and it's going to apply to everybody.

So the question is, is there something they didn't decide which may prevent us from moving forward with this common fund? If there isn't, then it's going to go forward and everybody is going to be bound.

MR. LUCK: I was only speaking to the question of whether you're effectively defaulting people for not raising particular issues as opposed to

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MR. FEEBACK: That was our understanding. THE COURT: If you have an extension of time, then if you have legal defenses, you can put those in your response when you file it.

MR. FEEBACK: Very well.

THE COURT: We're not cutting those off, but I see a difference between the insurers who are not defending and who are essentially indicating, "We are going to identify these claimants and pay them." To them, it becomes a compliance issue, and that's why I basically treated those differently, and that's where we got the attorney question coming in. Do they have to be represented by an attorney?

Brad wants to say something. Go ahead.

MR. LUCK: Your Honor, it's a little ironic in this setting where we have these cases that were decided against single insurers that evolved into common funds, and then evolved into global common funds binding the industry for, in some cases, back, you know, a couple of decades, that we're saying that unless you appear and raise issues, that you're going to be bound by them, when the turnabout should --They're bound by the decision, and then they should be

bound by the single rule of law absent a settlement. I think the example of the Flynn case is a

waiting to see what that single issue of law is and 2 being bound by it.

3 Absent a settlement, I think that even though 4 people don't hire counsel and come in and raise specific issues, that they should be in no different 6 position than the bigger carriers who have more at risk 7 that are litigating the issues waiting for the final 8 rule of law.

That's the only question I was speaking to. whether you're effectively defaulting people for not raising the issues and appearing.

THE COURT: I'm not defaulting them. I mean, they've been served and they can come in and resist it; but if they don't and they indicate that they're complying, they're basically indicating what you guys did in the Flynn case, which is, "We're going to comply. We're going to treat this as a common fund and we're going to pay it." Then I don't have anything to decide with respect to those insurers.

MR. LUCK: Actually, Your Honor, we negotiated a resolution that might be different than what other people negotiated, so we had an actual settlement, and there were terms and conditions to that settlement, and there was give and take.

I think that's very different than not coming

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in and actively defending and waiting to see what the Court, ultimately the Supreme Court, is going to determine is the rule of law that emanates from these cases.

It is true that maybe as to some of these issues, the writing is on the wall, but there are other legitimate issues that these carriers shouldn't have to maintain if they don't have several cases at issue and wait to see what the final determination is.

THE COURT: The problem is, they've been joined and served with a summons, and they have a choice. I mean, they can proceed and pay these claims, identify and pay the claims and agree, or they can resist. I mean, I can't -- I mean, how would you treat them? What would you do?

MR. JONES: Your Honor, let me use a hypothetical and see if I understand what Brad is saying.

Let's say I defend on Schmill II on that concept of what is closed or final. Let's assume the State Fund does not raise that defense. Let's say I prevail on that defense in a way so as to limit the scope, the number of cases, that fall under Schmill.

Now, the State Fund, under my hypothetical, has not participated. They haven't raised the same

e 1 be laches.

THE COURT: I know.

MR. JONES: Under my hypothetical, are you prepared to give us an answer? If the State Fund doesn't participate and I get a rule of law that diminishes my liability, the State Fund would get the benefit of that rule of law.

THE COURT: Well, are you raising laches as going back to a particular period of time or are you raising laches as defeating anything before --

MR. JONES: Your Honor, the scope of the application is not an issue. It's whether the State Fund, by not participating in the defense I've raised, foregoes the benefit of that defense if I prevail on it.

THE COURT: Well, I could apply that rule, and maybe I should. I mean, that's the question.

Well, firstly, you've got two different issues. You've got implementation issues and you've got defense issues, the defense issues being that this can't go forward because it is barred by something that hasn't been addressed by the Supreme Court. If it's been addressed by the Supreme Court, you're dead in the water and not going anywhere.

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defense or argued it, but will they get the benefit of that rule of law that limits, in my hypothetical, the number of cases that fall under Schmill? Is that the point?

THE COURT: Well, some of these issues become enforcement issues, and we may have to distinguish between -- or not enforcement issues, but implementation issues. It's not a question of whether or not there is a common fund. It becomes a question of who is within that common fund specifically.

So those become a little bit different, and those issues, I would think, would be common to all of the insurers. Resolving that issue would affect all of the insurers, no matter how they reply. Even if they agree that there is a common fund and come in, I think those issues would, there's resolution of those issues. Where you're arguing that there is no common fund, it's barred by laches and those sorts of things, those are legal defenses that defeat the whole thing, and that's a different matter.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, if I could expand on my hypothetical by way of anticipation, earlier you kept laches alive in one of my cases, the Miller case, which has since gone. In my hypothetical, I was anticipating one of the defenses under Schmill II could If it hasn't been and you think there's something that would distinguish it that would allow you to get back up there and make an argument against the common fund, that's one thing. Those are the absolute defenses.

Then you have implementation issues like the settlement issues, whether the -- the closed-case issues. I don't know, laches is sort of in between there. If you're arguing that you can only go back to 1995, you can't go past -- before 1995 or something like that, that may be an implementation issue. If you're arguing that laches basically bars all of the common fund claims, that's an absolute-defense type of issue.

As I see implementation issues, where you're just trying to sort out which of these claimants are entitled, the answers that I'm going to give as we go along and try to implement are going to apply to all of the insurers, whether or not they've abandoned legal defenses, you know, the absolute legal defenses or not.

But the other issues, the absolute defense issues I'm treating as being raised by those who have filed responses and raised the legal defense issues. Do you understand what I'm saying?

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MR. JONES: That does answer my question, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: We can go back here, and I could, I mean, one of the things I can do is basically say, whatever issues that you raise in response, you're going to be limited to, and you've abandoned the others. So even if Mike wins on his two issues and Brad hasn't raised those, Mike gets the benefit of the issues that he raises; but, Brad, you're stuck. You don't get the benefit.

MR. JONES: Unless they're implementation issues, correct?

THE COURT: Unless they're implementation issues.

MR. MARRA: Why wouldn't every insurer just say, "I'm joining in every issue raised by every insurer"?

THE COURT: Well, that's what I was basically throwing out, would be to take all of the absolute defenses and basically make them applicable across the board.

MR. DAVENPORT: I guess what I'm concerned about at this point is that I don't want to waive any rights that I may have to assert in an affirmative defense, while at the same time wanting to agree with you. Each company should raise their own defenses.

As to Tom Marra's question, I think that goes to what I said to the Court earlier, which is, I wouldn't mind if we had a list of the real defenses that we could brief. But, of course, that, you know, if somebody still wants to take another shot as to whether a common fund exists or whether failure to plead is a good defense, after we've now had several court decisions on that, then I guess I can't talk them out of it. But we would like to have a definite time when the briefs are done, and then move on from there.

THE COURT: Okay. But we've still got a little bit of an issue. I'm not sure I'm clear that you've addressed what my dilemma is.

With regard to implementation issues, I'm not treating those as being things that have to be raised as affirmative defenses. That's just in the implementation phase of identifying who is entitled, so things like closed files comes up. I don't think that is an affirmative defense that necessarily has to be raised in the answer.

MR. MURPHY: But you could have it raised if you wanted just by listing them for us and saying: "Okay, Counsel, let's brief these issues."

move forward in identifying potential claimants as we go through this, while over here, there are these issues that haven't been resolved completely.

But as Tom mentioned, if I have a client that's got one case that's affected by the Staveniord. I can't, in good conscience, make that client continue to pay large amounts when I can settle for two grand. or whatever the case may be.

I want to be able to pick and choose without violating any rights that any of our clients may have.

THE COURT: I think you can do that on an insurer-by-insurer basis.

Let me ask Larry and Tom and Rex, you sort of heard the way that I'm laying this out. Do you disagree with my treatment of implementation issues versus absolute defense issues?

MR. MURPHY: No, Judge, I wouldn't split it even. I would say affirmative defenses have to be raised in their response of plea, which you've said.

These are insurance companies. They're not unknowledgeable about how we proceed in court. They know that they have to raise their affirmative defenses, and if they haven't done so, then they should not be availed of the benefit of any other ruling in

any other insurance company's pleadings, so I agree. I

THE COURT: We're going to do that in Rausch, so that's going to be an implementation issue that will be addressed in Rausch.

But as to the true affirmative defenses which would defeat the common fund entirely in these cases. the question I have is, assuming I've got these issues and Brad joins in five of these issues and Mike Heringer joins in a different five and somebody else does that, when I resolve these issues, do all of the insurers who have raised any defense get the benefit of it, or do I strictly apply the decision only to those that raised that particular defense? If they didn't raise it, they still have to pay even though the other guys get out.

MR. MURPHY: If it's a defense, it has to be raised by the party.

> THE COURT: By the response. MR. MURPHY: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. You don't pool it. MR. JENNINGS: Your Honor, if we do that, I have a feeling a bunch of folks are going to run home

22 and do motions to amend saying, "Me too." 23

THE COURT: Well, except you've got to look at these issues and make sure, in good faith, you want to assert them. I think some of these issues are

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borderline, to be honest with you.

MR. ATWOOD: We're talking about common fund claims, and I think we're also talking about common fund defenses, and I think if you rule as a matter of law on any one of those defenses, that they ought to apply to all the defendants.

THE COURT: Well, that's the issue. I mean, you can have -- What do you do in civil litigation if you've got multiple defendants, and one comes in and asserts the statute of limitations, another fails to assert the statute of limitations, even though it applies to them as well. Isn't the one that failed to assert the statute of limitations on the hook because it's an affirmative defense?

MR. ATWOOD: Well, the way I look at this, you're talking about rules of law as opposed to affirmative defenses. So I think the distinction is a little bit different.

THE COURT: Well, that's an interesting question that we may want to even brief.

MR. LUCK: I agree wholeheartedly. That's not the same at all. We're talking about a rule of law here. Secondly, it's a little illogical for counsel for Mr. Reesor, who is the only one that brought up that issue to get it decided, and it applies

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MR. HUNT: -- but some of them can be combined. I'm trying to count them. There are about five or six issues that seem to break down between the 20. It seems, to me, that the Court could make a statement or categorize each of the issues; attorney fees, and then if you want to add some language onto it. Then everybody has a shot at briefing that issue and that category, so the briefs, at least, make some semblance of order. And then put a miscellaneous one in for those who feel like the categories don't have the issues.

That seems to me to be -- That would make it much easier to respond to and then reply back and for the Court to read all those briefs, rather than have -- If you brief each of these 20 issues, you're going to be pulling over here and over here and over here, and it's not going to make any sense.

So the more specific you can be with an issue, and I'm not sure you can do that, but I think the more time is going to be saved, and then have the miscellaneous category if people don't feel like it fits

THE COURT: One thing I can do is sort out new benefits by this after the fact too. Depending on how I answer, it may be unnecessary to do that.

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. . . .

to everybody, to say that the carriers aren't in the same boat.

Tom created, through his efforts, and Jim, a rule of law from the Reesor decision. It applies across the board; and what we're trying to do here is make some sort of logical process to ferret out how it applies and what the rules of law are.

MR. ATWOOD: I really don't think that you want us to have every single defendant have to brief every single issue in order to preserve it. I think that you're going to create so much paperwork for all of us to read that it's going to, at some point, break down. I think we have to use some practicalities, and there are some people who are going to feel stronger about some than others.

But if the rule of law is "X," whatever it happens to be, then all parties ought to be able to take advantage of it, just like we're going to be paying for all claims, you know, brought by a single individual that now applies to multiple individuals.

MR. HUNT: You know, I look at these issues. I think a lot of them, as you said, are moot --

THE COURT: I'm just about to run through some of them.

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In looking down at this first note, I mean, the first one, just looking at these, you know, no common fund exists. Well, the Supreme Court says there's a common fund, and they've also said it's global, so I don't know where we go with that.

MR. HUNT: My thought on that is, if somebody wants to brief that -- If you think that's been decided, you can put that under the miscellaneous category, and you set out what you think are the real issues.

THE COURT: Some of these are, I mean, some of these are absolute defenses and we probably could identify these, like "No common fund exists." That's an absolute defense. "Identify claimants benefitted by Reesor as an undue burden on insurers." I don't know what the legal defense is. Somebody is going to have to tell me what the legal defense is, and, you know, what if it's a burden for one of the insurers and not for the other? What the heck do I do with that? I don't know.

"Only original claimants are liable for attorney fees." Boy, I think the Supreme Court has spoken on that one.

"Failure to plead common fund fees." I think they've spoken on that one.

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"Reesor applies prospectively only." You can argue that, but the latest decision -- I saw in one of them it says, in somebody's response they said that it applies prospectively only because not all of the three Chevron criteria are met. But I think that's a complete misreading of Chevron and of Dempsey. If one of them is met, it has to be applied retroactively. You don't have to meet all three to apply it respectively. You just have to have one that isn't met, and it's applied retroactively. So I'm not sure whoever drafted that really understood what the rule is.

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"Legislative prohibition on common fund fees after 4/21/2003." I don't think that's probably an issue. I think that's fairly clear as a matter of law. It's in the statute.

17 MR. MURPHY: We're going to challenge 18 that, Judge. We'd like to brief that; not on 19 constitutional grounds, just on the straight reading of 20 that statute.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right. So maybe it is.

"Settled and adjudicated files should be excluded." That seems to be purely an implementation issue, and that's already been addressed in other

that defense goes. We've got a reservation of

2 additional possible defense which may be identified in

3 the implementation process. That really is not a 4 defense, but there could be issues arising in the

5 implementation process which I don't think we want to 6 close off.

"Common fund application would constitute impairment of contract." We can brief that. I know a lot about that particular area of law.

"No application to injuries occurring between 7/1/91 and 7/30/95 because of Russette." Now that's not -- Which case are we dealing with? Oh, we're talking about Reesor here. Reesor is our permanent partial disability thing, isn't it?

See, I'm on another page. I'm thinking Schmill and we're dealing with Reesor. See, I'm getting confused now.

Anyway, I think that one on (m), that Russette, is probably accurate. I think they were supposed to be paying based on Russette. That's the Supreme Court case that said that I can't write things into statutes that aren't there. So I don't know if we have an issue about any of these cases between 7/1/91 and 7/30/95. Maybe, Tom, have you thought about that?

MR. MURPHY: If the company asserted some

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cases, and we can spring for that. We've got Muir talking about that, one of the Muir cases.

"Files for deceased claimants should be excluded." That seems to me to be an implementation issue, which I don't think we need to brief that initially. We can get over that hurdle at some point.

"Laches or statute of limitations applies." Brad raised a statute of limitations defense. I'm not sure what his statute of limitations is. He didn't identify the statute of limitations that he wants to invoke in that.

But in any event, those would be absolute defenses to specific categories of claims, so I suppose that could be an absolute defense or it could be an implementation defense, because it wouldn't necessarily -- those two defenses might throw out some claims but not others, so I think we probably could address that up front.

"Petitioners' counsel should bear administrative and claims-related costs associated with 20 obtaining sufficient medical and vocational information." What medical and -- When I read that response, I don't know what they're talking about. because we're talking about apportionment. We're not talking about impairment award. So I'm not sure where Page 94

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sort of 710 defense, I haven't looked at it lately, but I'd like the opportunity to brief the issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, the problem is that the Supreme Court said that -- they've interpreted 710 as not applying to that period of time.

MR. MURPHY: I agree. I understand. I reread Russette when they raised this.

THE COURT: "Final and closed claims should be excluded." We're going to deal with that in Ruhd.

MR. MURPHY: Rausch.

12 THE COURT: Yeah, Ruhd-Rausch. Sometimes 13 I call it "Ruhd," sometimes I call it "Rausch." It's 14 the Ruhd-Rausch case. 15

"Application of the common fund would violate insurers' due process right." I suppose we can brief that. We're going to have to give notice to the AG, by the way, I think.

18 19 "Claimants, not insurers, should be liable 20 for attorney fees." I don't understand where that's coming from, because it's coming out of the benefits 21 22 payable to the claimant. So I don't remember who 23 raised that one, but I don't know why it's in there. 24

MR. PALMER: I think that for early cases, pre-'86, there's a good argument, especially '79

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and before. Simply succeeding created an obligation for the insurer to pay the attorney fees associated. So I think that there is an argument, and I think that's where it comes from.

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THE COURT: Except Reesor only goes back to '87.

MR. PALMER: Right. Reesor it wouldn't apply to.

THE COURT: Right. Plus, okay, that's a new twist on that one. I hadn't even thought about that one.

"The lien interferes with rights of claimants to contract with attorneys of their choosing." I'm not sure where that's coming from, because the lien is on the pool of money that's created, not the claimants. So it's a lien on a particular fund. So I'm not sure where that's coming from.

"The common fund is a disguise for a class action rule, and the Workers' Compensation Court has no class action rule." The Workers' Compensation Court doesn't have a class action rule, but the Supreme Court said there's a common fund, and in Muir I basically said the Court can borrow from the Rules of Civil Procedure for class actions anyway. So I don't know where that one is going.

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1 benefit them by every defense that they choose not to 2 participate in is perhaps also helping not to saddle

3 them with a claim that might go along with bad faith

4 issues that would arise out of raising defenses that

5 have been decided long ago and might only be involved

6 for purposes of delay, or at least as claimants' 7 counsel might view it.

THE COURT: Well, has anybody got -- Has a lightbulb gone off in anybody's head about how we handle this?

MR. MURPHY: Judge, I want to pitch that thing that I said at the start again. I think you've identified a handful of issues you'd like briefed. And, obviously, Tom Martello's statement that, you know, people should be allowed to brief additional issues, but you could list for us those issues that you think might need briefing, and then we can add in other ones if we want to. But that might get us started.

THE COURT: What if I do this, what if I try to consolidate these issues. Or maybe what I can do is set aside the issues and basically say, "Are you really serious about asserting this issue?" like the failure to plead common fund fees.

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MR. HUNT: Your Honor, I think that's going to result in more delay.

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"Other means not traditionally used should be used to identify benefitted claimants." That was Bill Bronson's defense, but that's not really a defense. It's a question on how we identify these claimants, and we've always been flexible in doing that. I don't know why we have to address that here.

"Application of the common fund would violate constitutional guarantees of freedom of contract and taking without just compensation."

So there's about a handful of constitutional defenses which basically would overturn the common fund rule in its entirety, and I suppose we need to brief those issues, but I think we probably can break them down. But, you know, some of these I don't even know why they're here.

MR. PALMER: I think that leads to a thought that I've had. We've been talking about some of these defenses as though they're all beneficial to the parties that might sit back and just say, "Me too." But there are consequences that go along with that. The parties that want to distance themselves from what appear to claimants' counsel as being frivolous may be doing a very wise thing.

They may not want to be saddled with those. I think the Court's inclination to not, shall we say,

1 THE COURT: Well, we're going to have to delay until we get the other insurers in anyway.

> MR. HUNT: Right, but I think you can, as Tom said, set out four or five issues, phrase them the way you want and then have a miscellaneous category.

5 6 If someone wants to argue about whether a common fund

7 is constitutional or exists, then that satisfies Tom's concern that people can argue whatever they want. But

I think you know the issues that you want briefed, and

10 if people choose to not address those issues and

11 address them somewhere else, then that's up to them.

12 But I think if you're going to get 30 or 40 briefs, or 13

however many it may be, for you to try to tie them 14 together without some common thread running through

15 them is going to be a pretty hard thing to do, and it's 16 also going to be a pretty hard thing for anybody else

17 to get their hands on to try to respond to.

18 MR. LUCK: Your Honor, I think we're 19 talking about two separate things. Certainly the Court 20 can organize the manner in which we brief, outline 21 issues you think need to be briefed and allow people to 22 raise what other issues they want to. I think the process is going to cut down the number of issues that

23 24 are briefed in the final process.

I think that's a good idea from an

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organizational standpoint. But we were also talking before about waiver of rights and single rule of law. I think what ought to go along with that is, we should organize how we're going to brief it, allow people the opportunity to then brief whatever they want, but it seems to me that certainly at least for those participating in filing responses and briefing, and I think for everybody that hasn't settled, but at least for those people participating, whatever ends up being the rule of law, whether you've brief it or not, should be applicable to your claims.

So there's two questions. One is this waiver issue that we've been talking about, and the other is organizational. I like the idea of organizing and allowing us to have a miscellaneous section. But whatever finally is determined on all of the issues ought to be applicable to every insurer.

THE COURT: Well, yeah, and the question is, do we brief that now or do we sort it out after I issue a ruling? The thing about these cases is, I think the Supreme Court has spoken fairly clearly in the Dempsey case and also in the Schmill and the Ruhd case, and I don't see a lot of wiggle room. I know some of the insurance attorneys see a lot of wiggle room, but I don't see a lot of wiggle room in these

1 list res ajudicata.

THE COURT: For what? Res ajudicata for what?

MR. LUCK: The application of the Supreme Court decision in the Fisher versus State Farm case, where if issues aren't raised in other litigation that could have been raised and that case is resolved, you can't raise it for another claim.

THE COURT: Yeah, except you've read the decisions I've issued on that particular thing. I mean, basically in workers' compensation, that rule doesn't really apply except in a very narrow context. I mean, you can raise that but -- And, actually, you know, you can raise any issues you want, and you can litigate them and you can take them up with the Supreme Court.

One of the questions is, we've got this process, and if I say this goes forward or it goes forward on a, you know, maybe limit the way it goes forward, or it goes forward in full, you know, and somebody wants to go to the Supreme Court, we're going to have to figure out what we do then, because that's really not a final judgment. It may be an interlocutory judgment. We're going to have to figure out what to do then.

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cases.

And the constitutional issues would basically completely overturn the Common Fund Doctrine. You'd have to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt, and that's always an uphill fight. So it may well be that resolution of those issues moots the other issues, in any event.

So I agree with you on the organizational thing. I think what I'm hearing from both you and Tom is for me to try to give some organization to the issues and then throw those out, and then brief those within the framework of that organization. And then if there are other issues that are raised that you don't think is within that framework that's within the responses that have been filed in that, you can go ahead and add those on and then resolve those issues, and then go on from there. Would that make you happy?

MR. LUCK: Your Honor, if you directed it, it would really please me.

I'm not sure what you meant other than the organizational part, though, in relation to being binding on everybody; and is that taking into account that you are going to give some additional time for some additional defenses that you might not think are spurious? For instance, I think we would add to the

MR. LUCK: Your Honor, the supposition here from the claimants is that there's going to be some sort of irresponsible briefing and maintenance of issues that shouldn't be maintained. The fact that virtually all of the issues that could be mentioned were mentioned in these responses as requested in order to make a procedural filing is a lot different than what people would decide to brief.

THE COURT: Well, and I agree with you, and that's why I raised the original question about sorting the chaff out of the rest of them, is how we do that.

MR. HUNT: I don't think you're going to do that today, and I certainly would never think that an insurance company or defense lawyer would intentionally delay anything, but if you allow the miscellaneous category, then if Brad wants to put that res ajudicata argument in that category, then that's fine. Or you've got other time limitations in here. If he wants to put it there, that's fine too.

But I think you just need to make a decision and move forward with it rather than having people start staying: "Okay, we want to have this defense," or "We want to have that defense," and give us time to amend the petitions.

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THE COURT: Well, yeah, I mean, you've put your finger on one of my concerns, and that is, we could go through this process where everybody moves to amend their responses to add defenses or raise new defenses and things like that.

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My honest-to-God feeling about that is we ought to just have a date that says, you know, here is the list of the stuff that I want briefed, and organize it. Probably if I say that, I'm probably going to throw out some; and if anybody wants to put back in that the failure to plead the common fund fees is an extension to that, they're welcome to do that and stand up before me and argue that with a straight face.

But, I mean, if I make that list, probably that's one of them that's going to go out. But maybe make that list, and then if you think there's something on there that should be included that isn't included, have everybody respond to that; and if there are additional issues, allow them to do that. I'd rather have that done than having all sorts of motions to amend. I'd rather get it wrapped up in one and get the whole thing in.

MR. MURPHY: I agree. I also, I really don't see a need to wait for additional insurers to come in.

not raising any legal defenses. They're not contesting their liability, and they're not contesting paying the claimants and these attorneys getting common fund

Now, if they make that payment, I suppose the claimant could come in when we set the attorney fees and argue they're not entitled to attorney fees because it was never due. I can't foreclose that because we haven't -- I can't set the attorney fees until the point that we've got the claims paid. So, yes, I think essentially what you've stated is correct.

MR. DAVENPORT: Point of clarification. Are we talking about this one particular case that we're going to be doing, or is it all common fund cases?

THE COURT: Well, whatever we do in this case is going to apply to -- basically I'll be setting -- I'll be disposing of the issues for the other cases, just like the one case -- the one issue that we're going to put over to Rausch-Ruhd, the closed-files claim, that's going to set the precedent for all of them.

That's why I say, anybody who wants to brief any of those issues is welcome to do so. File a brief, and I'll just treat them as an amici brief.

THE COURT: Well, we can start the process, but the process has to give them time to get involved and make their pitch.

MR. MURPHY: But the briefing schedule for the parties that have appeared, what's the purpose of delaying that? Let's get it started.

THE COURT: Probably what I'll do, we're going to get those additional summonses out, but we'll put dates so that there are deadlines that are beyond that. It's going to take us some time to do that anyway, so I don't think it's going to be a big deal. So if they want to respond, they'll see that. In fact,

13 we could even send out the notice with the summonses so 14 that they know what the schedule is.

15 MR. MURPHY: That would be great. Thank 16 you.

MS. GILCREST: So if an insurer appeared and made one defense and there are potentially 30 raised, they've essentially preserved all 30 of those. But if an insurer appeared and gave information or said, "We have four claimants," and made no defense, they've essentially waived all 30 defenses; is that correct?

THE COURT: Well, the way I'm viewing it right now, if they're providing information, they're

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Okay. Does anybody else want to say anything more about that? All right. I'll try to draft up a list and get it circulated and then throw the monkey back. I'll try to develop the issues. On the 5 constitutional issues, I'll give notice to the Attorney General, who has never appeared in any case in which 6 I've issued constitutional notice; but anyway, we'll get that going, because I think they have 20 or 30 days 9 to respond. So I'll put that in the thing, and I'll 10 probably group those together.

MR. LUCK: Your Honor, just as part of that organization, in the Stavenjord briefing, you indicated that you were having two phases, I mean, formally advocating or documenting two phases; one, the entitlement issues, and then the implementation issues.

17 So what you're talking about, this 18 organization of issues all are going to be entitlement issues reserving implementation issues for a later 20

21 THE COURT: I'll separate those out, if 22 somebody thinks some of those should be entitlement 23 issues versus implementation issues. 24

Why don't we take a break. (A recess was taken.)

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THE COURT: Okay. I think actually we've probably confronted the most difficult area that we're probably going to deal with. If there's anything more difficult, I think we should all go home, because I don't know as we'll be able to do it.

Looking at the rest of Reesor, it looks to me -- Is there anything else? Briefing schedule, we'll work on that. Tracking, we already talked about tracking. We talked about insurers not properly served. I guess, in Reesor, is there anything else we need to talk about?

MR. MURPHY: Yes, Judge, I'd like to raise the issue of the joint statement of stipulated facts that was proposed by the State Fund.

I think everybody knows that the facts that they're putting in here are their own facts. We're not doing any discovery to verify these things. I've asked Brad to just prepare this and present it to the Court as an affidavit, rather than make us sign off on it like we've got something to say about it or like we've investigated any of these things we've been telling you.

I would like it if you could actually abandon any attempt to try to force the Reesor common fund claimants to sign off on a joint statement of

Ruhd. "Closed case." I don't know as we need to discuss that. We just need to set a briefing schedule 2 3 on that. The only thing that's going to come up and be 4 an issue is going to be what you mean by "closed case" and how a closed case comes about.

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I think you need -- I suppose you can put that in your brief. I guess the question is, does there need to be any factual basis for it? I think maybe if you can just give me the possibilities, I can address each of the possibilities. What do you think,

MR. DALE: That's probably the way we'll have to deal with it, because there are factual issues as to what that would be considered. Larry, I think, has his definition he would consider.

MR. FLOCH: For the purposes of those of us that are just getting into this, are we talking about "closed" as it was defined in Schmill II? Is that sort of --

THE COURT: Well, we're trying to define what the Supreme Court meant by "closed" in Schmill II.

22 MR. FLOCH: Because I don't think they 23 ever used the word "closed." They said "final" or 24 "settled."

THE COURT: Right.

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stipulated facts.

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THE COURT: What are we doing the joint statement of stipulated facts for?

MR. LUCK: Your Honor, we agreed to and were directed by the Court to follow the process that we followed, I believe, in Stavenjord, where we worked on a stipulation together and outlined the facts and then briefed the issues with those stipulated facts.

We started the same process here, went through that process, gave it to Mr. Murphy, and he wanted us to do it by way of affidavit because he didn't want to sign off on any sort of a stipulation. and we're prepared to do that.

THE COURT: So this will be in conjunction with the defenses we were talking about earlier.

MR. MURPHY: It's the briefing, Judge. When this started in Stavenjord, that's when they were raising the Chevron Oil defense. As we know now in 20 Dempsey, it's not so viable. I don't know what we need this group of facts for, but if they want to present it, I think the best way would be in affidavit form.

THE COURT: I'll just take it that way.

24 Let's go to -- Anything else on Reesor? 25

Let's go to Ruhd and Rausch, or Rausch and

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MR. FLOCH: So are those -- Just so I'm on the same page, those are the issues, whether it's 3 final or settled?

THE COURT: That's true, but I think what Larry is going to argue is if they close the file and stamp it, it's closed, that that constitutes final and settled.

MR. FLOCH: Or settled.

THE COURT: Well, it won't be settled. 10 but final. I think he's going to argue that.

MR. FLOCH: I just wanted to be clear on what the issue was.

THE COURT: I guess the question is, is this another one -- Well, I suppose I should open it up for briefing.

Larry, can you write a short statement as to what you contend constitutes final and settled, from your point of view, from the closed-file point of view, and provide that to us so that I can provide it to all counsel, and then we'll just set a briefing schedule on it?

21 22 MR. JONES: Your Honor, yes. 23 THE COURT: Okay, Brad?

24 MR. LUCK: Your Honor, I was only going to respond. The Court did, in Schmill II, refer to the

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Dempsey language of final or settled. It was also in the context of settled, closed or inactive. That has created some concern, and I think that's the basis of the genesis of Larry's concern, and I think it's all part of the package.

THE COURT: Yeah, I probably ought to see your brief and see what you raised, because they said they weren't going to make those sorts of determinations. I don't think they were indicating anything in that other than the fact that they were going to put it back in this ball court as opposed to theirs in the first instance. What was your argument in that case?

MR. LUCK: Your Honor, I think the context was trying to get some underscoring of the fact that workers' compensation cases and claims are different and handled differently in the Montana legal system than regular tort claims, and trying to get a Dempsey focus on the particular circumstances and proceedings involved in workers' compensation claims to determine what that finality that they talked about in Dempsey really meant in terms of comp claims. So we actually were trying to get some resolution of that issue.

THE COURT: What they meant by "finality"

THE COURT: That would. Do you want to collaborate with Larry before he files it, or do you

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2 3 want to see what he files and then get a chance to add 4 to it? 5

MR. LUCK: We'll collaborate with him, 6 Your Honor, and if we need to file something separately, we will. We don't need to wait to see what 8 his filing will be. 9

THE COURT: Why don't I put a week deadline on it. If you can't do it within a week, just let me know and I'll give you more time.

Then I'll set a briefing schedule. Anybody have any feelings for how long it will take to brief it? It will be primarily Brad and Larry who are going to be the primary briefers. How long do you think it will take you to put together something to argue it?

MR. HARRINGTON: Judge, with the other briefing we have in some of the other cases, I'd prefer to maybe get until mid-August.

20 THE COURT: Okay. We can go forward on 21 Ruhd and Rausch by doing that. Okay.

MR. HARRINGTON: If that's too far. Judge, obviously, we can shuffle some things around. THE COURT: We're already mid-July.

25 We forgot about Mr. Atwood. I just looked at

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in Dempsey?

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MR. LUCK: Yeah. And because of the particular nature of the comp claims and comp system in Montana, what that meant

THE COURT: I've read Dempsey, and I think I know what they were trying to do. I'm not sure that it was clear, but I have some ideas about that. I'll have to see what your ideas are.

Larry, why don't you set it out. Can you do that in a week?

MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Brad, are you going -- Do you want to go down that road? Do you want to say something about it, as well, what you're contending?

MR. LUCK: Your Honor, our client would like us to participate in the briefing on that.

THE COURT: Would you tell me what your contentions are as far as what constitutes finality for purposes of retroactivity?

MR. LUCK: In terms of a filing?

THE COURT: Yes.

22 MR. LUCK: Yeah. I think maybe the best 23 thing for us to do is we'll see what Larry puts

24 together and then see what, if anything, we want to add 25

to that, join in or not. Would that be acceptable?

the telephone and realized it. We need to get Ron on

the phone and tell him we didn't intentionally forget him.

(Off the record.)

THE COURT: Ron, this is Judge McCarter. I forgot about you and we started out, so just to catch you up, we went through the rest of the Reesor agenda. There wasn't anything really there. We basically decided there wasn't much to discuss other than a joint statement of facts, and it's between the State Fund and the Reesor attorneys, and that's going to come in by way of affidavit, and that just pertains to the issues that we're ultimately going to brief.

Then on Ruhd-Rausch, we're down to Ruhd-Rausch, and we're talking about closed-case issues. Larry Jones and Brad Luck are going to supply a statement summarizing what they contend constitute closed cases, or in the language of Dempsey, what cases have finality for purposes of retroactivity, the retroactivity rule.

21 So they're going to provide that statement, 22 and then we're going to establish a briefing schedule, 23 and I think we're going to shoot for mid-August for the 24 opening briefs.

I wonder if we can't just have simultaneous

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briefs, and anybody who wants to address the issue, just file it simultaneously. Is there any reason not to do that? Then we can have anybody who wants to file a reply to anybody else's brief.

MR. DALE: So, first, he'd have a week to give us what his definition is, and then we have simultaneous briefing on it?

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THE COURT: Right, so about the middle of August. If for some reason that one week slides, we'll let the other date slide too. Then I'll just pick out a couple of weeks after that to file response briefs.

Is that something everybody wants to orally argue? Larry always likes to orally argue these. Do you want to orally argue it or do you want me to just sit down and grind it out?

MR. JONES: Your Honor, oral argument won't be necessary.

THE COURT: Okay. That brings up the continued review of the Liberty file. I think at least pending the decision on what constitutes finality and closed files and what that means, or within that, what I want to do is just proceed under the same lines we're proceeding, whatever files you've identified under the criteria, just proceed in that fashion. I mean, there's no harm in that.

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2 MR. DALE: That's an agenda item. 3 THE COURT: Well, we'll talk about that.

4 That's agenda Item No. 6. We're talking about interim 5 payments. In any of the cases, in Broeker or Muir --

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6 Did Greg leave, or Tom? Did they leave? 7

MR. HAWKINS: Yes.

THE COURT: Did Nancy leave too?

MR. HAWKINS: Yes.

10 THE COURT: Oh, gosh. Maybe Brad knows. 11 MR. HAWKINS: What am I, Your Honor,

12 chopped liver?

THE COURT: You weren't involved in

14 any of that.

15 MR. HAWKINS: Greg Overturf here, for the 16 record.

THE COURT: You weren't involved in either of those cases.

MR. HAWKINS: No. Ask Brad.

THE COURT: I know Brad was involved with that because I still remember the Broeker meaning in which I thought the dam was going to break and all hell was going to break loose, and it was all Brad's fault.

MR. LUCK: Just before it got settled,

25 you mean.

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If some of those end up being not payable because they're deemed closed or whatever, you know, you just don't have to pay them, that's all. So I would go forward on that basis.

What's the status with the review of Liberty files?

MS. GARBER: Your Honor, I'm about halfway through the cases that did not settle, wherein either they had a zero percent impairment rating or they had perm partial benefits that were paid out biweekly. I have about 40 more to look at in that category. The rest were cases that either settled before or after the date of the decision; and in our informal discussions, FFR attorneys are not overly interested in looking at some of those cases that were represented by attorneys. They only are interested in ones that were not represented by attorneys, but we'll try to get those files available.

THE COURT: Do I need to do anything at this point? Are there any disputes out there that I need to talk to you about?

MS. GARBER: I think the only issue that I'm aware of that Lon brought up was sort of a tiered approach to getting their payments made.

THE COURT: Oh, yeah, that's on my list

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1 THE COURT: Right, just before it got settled. I now know that "storm clouds" doesn't 3 necessarily mean rain.

I don't recall entering an order for payment of attorney fees in either of those cases. Am I wrong, or were there any?

MR. LUCK: Your Honor, I recall that we had -- In Muir?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LUCK: We had a hearing and you entered the order after a public hearing. I don't think there was any kind of interim order of any kind. We had a large public hearing, and then you issued an order after that, is what I recall.

MR. CADWALLADER: Your Honor, that's my recollection as well. Since the Department is watching and somewhat monitoring those Muir cases, especially with respect to attorney fees, I believe that there was no distribution until after a hearing, and there was an opportunity for claimants, whether represented or otherwise, to make their objections. I recall that there were a couple of objections, and that in certain cases the attorneys may have waived fees under Muir.

MR. LUCK: Your Honor, I recall also that there were some lump sums paid after that time that

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ended up creating some problems, because when individual files were reviewed, some of them were paid again and we had an overpayment problem because of that. But I do think that -- I think we waited totally on attorney fees until we had an approval order.

THE COURT: Well, I can't fix attorney fees until we hold the hearing, and I can't hold the hearing until we're done. We talked about this briefly on the telephone, Lon, and I think I suggested that you think about, you know, if we were to do it, how would we do it and what would we use to measure it.

MR. DALE: I think we have a different situation than we had in Muir because, first of all, we have identified certain permanent totals that have impairments. So, I mean, they're identified, they're clearly there.

So the idea would be to simply give notice to those claimants and advise them as to what fees we would be assessing and give them the opportunity to object, because there's no reason to just wait, which may be months now under this latest round of briefing schedules and things, when we have, clearly, claimants for whom fees have been assessed and there's no dispute, I think; am I right on that, Larry?

MR. JONES: Your Honor, Liberty is the

1 "Okay, you're authorized to take 25 percent from them 2 because they didn't object," and then have somebody 3 come in and object and set a different fee. I'm not 4 sure I can do that.

MR. PALMER: Your Honor, I understand that there have been Muir attorney fees paid, and it's not at the end. They're, in fact, still paying out some claims. So I wasn't quite clear. What do we expect to happen? Wait several years to the very end or will there be a hearing this fall or what's going to happen?

THE COURT: Well, we have to identify the claimants first, and all the claimants were identified in that particular case and given notice. There were still some outstanding ones, not very many, in file review, and I think they're basically settled-case questions, as to whether or not they come within some sort of an exception. Those took some additional time. and I think those claimants were given notice, and we had a public hearing on it.

So we essentially had identified all the claimants before we had that hearing, and then gave them notice of the attorney fees, allowed them to show up and object.

We did the same thing in Broeker. We did the

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banker on this thing.

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THE COURT: You don't care.

MR. JONES: Well, only to the extent that if some of the files Lon believes require payment might fall under the issue of settled, closed or inactive. If they don't fall under that, under our own analysis, then we just want a directive from the Court on how to proceed.

THE COURT: The problem I have is that under the Common Fund Fee Doctrine, I'm supposed to fix the amount of a fee, and we could end up in a situation if you're contacting these claimants individually, you could work out different agreements with different claimants, or you might charge the full 25 percent and they might agree to that, and I might end up saying only 15 percent or 20 percent or 22 percent or something like that.

I think in Muir there was an agreement for 15 percent, and in one of the other cases I think I saw 15 percent.

MR. DALE: A State Fund case. THE COURT: Okav, so I don't know --Since the Court has to fix the fee, I don't know how we could do that in advance without fixing it for everybody. I don't know as I can fix a fee and say:

same thing in that. We held a hearing in that before 2 we disbursed any attorney fees, and I fixed the 3 attorney fees in both of those cases. I have to fix 4 the fee, and I'm not sure, I think I'd be advocating

5 that responsibility if essentially I authorized any of 6 the claimants' attorneys here to contact the individual 7 claimants and negotiate an agreement for a fee, which

8 sounds like what we're doing.

MR. DALE: That isn't what we contemplated, Your Honor. First of all, we have already assessed fees pursuant to the agreement, pursuant to notice, to claimants with the State Fund. So, you know, we've kind of gone down that road; and what we've proposed here would be to kind of treat it more on a per-insurer basis, and that's what we're looking at with Liberty.

In other words, this is a Liberty issue, and 17 18 so we would look at the Liberty claimants that are 19 clearly identified, just as we did with the State 20 Fund. I mean, if you follow the State Fund 21 determination, you look at that, we looked at the 22 agreement, the claimants were given notice, they had 23 their opportunity to object.

And quite frankly, it appears as if we're not going to charge the maximum fee, based upon my

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discussion with Steve and Monte, so there's a reduction involved.

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THE COURT: Right, but two things here; number one, you had identified the claimants, and they were given notice and an opportunity to object, which we don't have in this case. Firstly, we'd have to go through that process with Liberty and identify all of them, and perhaps we could identify them and separate them out. That's the first difference.

The second difference is the agreement in that case occurred before the Ruhd case came down.

MR. DALE: That's correct.

THE COURT: So we were basically working with a single insurer, and now we're working with a universe that consists of everybody.

Theoretically, we could end up with different attorney fees for different insurers, depending on whether or not the individual claimants that were notified objected or not, and depending on what I determine. You know, if there was an objection. I'd have to adjudicate that for each insurer, wouldn't I?

MR. DALE: I think the objection would be adjudicated per claimant. I mean, it's the claimant's objection. It's the individual claimant's objection: and as long as they're given due process and they have

And another question is, in the fee proceeding, do I set fees just for those persons who appear and object? I don't think that's the way it works, and maybe I'm wrong about that.

The other problem is, if they disburse and you disburse the 25 percent and I hold a hearing, whether as to other Liberty claimants or to the universe, and decide it's only going to be 17 percent, then what do we do, because you're going to have been overpaid for those? Or, again, do you get to collect a bigger fee from some than from others?

Has anybody looked to see if there are any cases on setting common fund fees? I mean, virtually I got no objections as to the rate of the fees in either the Muir case or the Broeker case, and I didn't have to address that issue, and also the fees were pretty reasonable in that particular case. But I don't recall seeing any law on how I fix those fees and what I consider. I know there's cases in the class action area, but I don't know of any in the common fund. Steve Jennings?

22 MR. JENNINGS: You answered my question. 23 sir.

MR. DALE: I think it's the Court's discretion.

the opportunity to appear and object to the fee, I don't think you have to have every single claimant at the same time.

I guess that's our position, and we basically have identified certain claimants that there is no dispute, that there would be benefits received that the common fund applies to.

MS. GARBER: Your Honor, just to clarify, those claimants have been paid 75 percent of the benefits; 25 percent was withheld. So what they're asking for is a disbursement of some portion of that.

MR. DALE: That's a benefit to the claimant, as Carrie pointed out, too, Your Honor, because we anticipate that we're not going to charge the full fee, so they would actually receive a benefit that is currently being withheld. So it's to their benefit to proceed as timely as we can, as expeditiously as we can too.

THE COURT: But there's a couple of issues here, and that is, indeed, if I have the authority and the responsibility of fixing the attorney fees, can I allow you to basically have a different fee for different claimants depending on whether or not they specifically object?

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THE COURT: Right, but in the class actions, there's all sorts of things. I know there's a load-start theory and load-start considerations and stuff like that. I don't know, I'm not going to rule on it right now.

My suggestion would be -- Tom Harrington? MR. HARRINGTON: Your Honor, in Rausch when we had the hearing on fees with the State Fund here in the Court, Lon and Monte and Steve had the sliding scale of attorney fees, where certain claimants had less taken out of their entitlement than others, and there were also two gentlemen who appeared at that hearing and objected, and Steve waived the fee as to those two claimants. I don't know if that gives you any precedent, but --

THE COURT: It probably doesn't. The sliding scale, though, was based on some sort of criteria, wasn't it?

MR. HARRINGTON: It was based on age at the time.

THE COURT: Right, because they didn't get as big a benefit because they weren't getting it many years in advance. That's reasonable. I mean, I agree, that's reasonable. Can you go look for some cases and see if there's anything out there?

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MR. DALE: Sure. What we propose is, Larry and I and Carrie can all get together and probably present a proposal for you on what we have in mind, and then give you some cases on it too.

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THE COURT: That would be helpful. MR. DALE: What we have in mind. Your Honor, is not charging a full fee on this, similar to what Tom brought up with the State Fund. We probably would use that kind of as a template, if you will, as to where we may go here, although we probably will have a larger percentage, but yet less than what we would be entitled to.

So I think that there's a benefit to the claimant to have these things adjudicated as they arise under those scenarios.

THE COURT: Larry, did you have a mediation at 4:00? Did I mess you up?

MR. JONES: Your Honor, thank you. I meant to tell you during the break I got that taken care of.

THE COURT: Thanks. I thought maybe I 21 22 just messed you up. 23

Let me ask this to attorneys for other insurers. Do you have any views on what we do in this situation, whether we can authorize interim

would like a fee might fall under our argument of settled, closed or inactive. Otherwise, we'll be glad to work with Lon, but we want the Court's protection.

THE COURT: All right. Work something out. David?

MR. HAWKINS: As to the State Fund, not really on this case, but as to other cases as this stuff applies going forward, we've got a certain administrative burden in processing the fees out of the claim and to the attorneys. And in the case where we've got several thousand claimants, we're going to be -- it's going to be a significant burden to us simply to get payments out.

So it's not without cost to the insurers, so the fewer times we have to pay attorney fees --

THE COURT: You're telling me you might take a little different position than Larry on it? You might be more interested in what goes on?

MR. HAWKINS: Yes.

THE COURT: Well, I just have to deal with Larry. The only thing is it may set some sort of precedent, but I'd like to get some law on it if there is any. I don't know whether there is or not. Let's look for it, and present me a proposal and present me

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payments or whether we can do it on an insurer-by-insurer basis or anything along those lines? Anybody thought about it?

MR. MARRA: Carrie mentioned it, and it seemed logical to me, does the insurer really have a position to take in those instances since it's really the claimants' fees? It's not really the insurers' fees. It seems like, what kind of standing does the insurer have to come in and say, "Well, no, you can only have this percentage"?

THE COURT: Fiduciary duty to protect the claimant. No, you know, I see your position. I mean, it's basically like Larry, they don't have the stake in it, so the burden falls back on the Court. And I guess what I'm asking for is for input and ideas, if anybody has any.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, my client's position is it only wants to pay once, and that's why 18 19 we need an order from the Court to protect us.

THE COURT: Right. I don't think anybody is going to dispute you on that.

MR. JONES: As far as Lon's proposal, to respond to Lon, we're not taking a position, and what he's proposing is something we're prepared to

25 participate in, again, as long as a case that they some cases and I'll look at it.

Let's back up here. Lon, this is a question for you. I was wondering, what's the status of your analysis of information as provided by non-Liberty insurers, insurers other than Liberty? Is there any progress in looking at that information?

MR. DALE: We're working on it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: How do you anticipate proceeding? How do you want to handle it?

If anybody who needs to leave has something they need to talk about that's on the agenda, let me know and I'll take it up immediately if you have to do that.

MR. HERINGER: I handled mine at the break with Lon, and Brad will handle the Satterly issues.

THE COURT: Sorry for the length. Go ahead, Lon, I'm sorry.

20 MR. DALE: We're in the process of doing 21 our review of the data that we have. Now, you're not talking about the -- When you say Liberty affiliates, 22 23 you're talking about all Plan 1s and 2s?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DALE: We've kind of been focusing

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with Liberty and we haven't probably done everything
that we should there, but we're working on the
electronic information, and Jackie gave us some more.
so we're proceeding.
        THE COURT: Okay. When you get to the
point where you think you know how we should proceed
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with those, let me know. MR. DALE: Okay. We'll keep you posted. THE COURT: Anything else on Rausch and

10 Ruhd?

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MR. ATWOOD: Your Honor, I just want to let you know I'm still here. I'm not sleeping.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ATWOOD: In terms of as you send out your briefing schedule, are you just going to send that out to everybody that's appeared or is there a separate list for Rausch-Ruhd people that you have a circulation on? And the reason I ask is that neither of my clients have been served in that case. So if you have a separate, I'm going to have to appear, in a sense, as an amicus.

THE COURT: You're talking about briefing of the closed-cases issue?

MR. ATWOOD: Yes.

THE COURT: I'll be inviting briefs

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MR. LUCK: Good point.
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THE COURT: All right, Flynn: (1), I think we've talked about; (2), we've talked about; (3) and (4) we've talked about. I guess, Rex, we'll get back to you a little bit more on following up on any service that we need and also any tracking, and you were part of that.

Then (5) is: "What legal issues remain in light of Schmill II?" Let's see, we've gotten a whole bunch of responses in Flynn. Let me take a look here. We've got 283 that replied out of 671 that responded in some fashion.

Now, this is a case where the Supreme Court 14 hasn't said that there is a global common fund or even a common fund other than the common fund on the -- This is the common fund on the common fund case. So there may be some issues we need to address in this case that maybe we don't need to address in some of the other cases, I don't know. But I haven't looked at the responses.

21 I'm assuming, looking down here, there's a whole bunch of "yeses" on legal issues, and I haven't 22 23 looked at those.

Has anybody looked at those legal issues? Are we talking about the same sort of legal issues that

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are raised in Reesor, basically? 2

MR. PALMER: Very similar. 3 THE COURT: We have to do some reservice in that case, so we have the same situation we do in 5 Reesor. Do we want to consolidate briefing of those 6 issues since they probably are pretty much the same issues? Do we want to consolidate the briefing of

those issues with the briefing in Reesor?

MR. PALMER: I'm not sure where we draw 10 the line on efficiency here, because on the one hand we 11 want everybody served so we don't have to redo 12 anything. By the same token, we want to get the ball rolling, because once the decisions are made, then 13 14 they're final, at least as to those people, and the 15

major players involved have responded. THE COURT: Well, here's another question: Do we need to consolidate? Because if we answer these questions in Reesor, they're obviously going to be answered in Flynn if the same defenses have been raised. So do we need to do anything or shall we just leave it alone and proceed with the service in Flynn and get along with Reesor, and then find out where we're at after I decide the Reesor issues?

23 24 MR. PALMER: I think if we let Reesor 25 take its course and we go through the process of

from everyone on that, so we will notify the global list.

MR. ATWOOD: Okay. Thank you. MR. LUCK: Your Honor, would this be a good time to talk about the reverse common fund consideration from the Ruhd decision in the '87 to '91 benefits.

THE COURT: I suppose.

MR. LUCK: How we quantify the fees and the benefit for not having to pay those benefits from '87 to '91? That's just a little common fund humor for you. Apparently, very little.

THE COURT: You mean, you want them to pay fees because they lost.

MR. LUCK: Because we didn't have to pay out all that money.

THE COURT: Unfortunately, it doesn't work that way.

MR. CADWALLADER: Was that from the insureds that you were seeking those fees as regular defense costs?

MR. LUCK: In terms of justice, anybody that would be willing to pay them.

24 MR. DALE: If the statute hasn't been 25 changed, Brad, you'd probably have a chance at it.

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finalizing service and then put some deadlines in, just for raising the legal issues, perhaps a lot of them will have fallen away by virtue of the rulings in Reesor, maybe all of them.

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MR. MURPHY: The parties in Flynn probably are the same parties as in Reesor, so those parties will be appearing and making their argument.

> THE COURT: In Reesor? MR. MURPHY: Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's not burden ourselves with additional schedules and stuff like that. We'll just, you know, anybody who is appearing in Flynn who wants to file a brief in Reesor can do it. and we'll be done with it. There might be some unique issues in Flynn. I don't know. There could be.

MR. DAVENPORT: Is it not feasible that when it comes to the question, for example, I was sharing the question as to whether or not there is a certifiable class in Flynn might have a different answer than it would in Reesor?

THE COURT: Yeah, it could in Flynn, that's right. It could, perhaps, in any of the cases we haven't ultimately resolved it. That's potentially possible, yeah.

days; and at that time, Your Honor, we're going to file our briefs and some affidavits with some factual information we'd like to put into the record.

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We anticipate that that does not affect the August 22nd hearing date, understanding that counsel for Mr. Satterly needs to have time to respond, and I think they felt like they could get something in very late, before the hearing.

THE COURT: Like the Thursday before the hearing?

MR. HUNT: That's correct, Your Honor. Could we set a date for their brief on ten days so we don't get into this three days for mailing and two days for weekends, and it ends up being 18 days?

15 MR. LUCK: It will be ten calendar days 16 from the 25th it will be filed.

17 MR. HUNT: August 25th?

18 THE COURT: No, that doesn't work out.

19 Hold on. I've got a calendar here. Okay, it's 20 originally due what date?

MR. LUCK: I believe the 25th, Your 22 Honor.

23 THE COURT: Of July. 24 MR. LUCK: Yes, sir.

25 THE COURT: That's a Monday, so the 8th.

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MR. DAVENPORT: I mean, all of the other issues that I would see would probably dove-tail, but the issue of a certifiable class in, like, Hyatt and Flynn are, in my opinion, quite different than some of the others.

THE COURT: Yeah, the most difficult one is in Hyatt.

Let's see here, liquidation, uninsured --We lost the uninsureds. Oh, Mark, are you going to talk about it? Brian was here for a while. I didn't realize he was going to leave.

MR. CADWALLADER: Yes, Your Honor. He car-pools to Great Falls.

THE COURT: Let me talk about one other thing, and then I'm going to let everybody go except for some of you. We're going to talk about asbestos cases, and before that, we'll talk about UEF cases briefly. Well, except that we need the petitioners' attorneys to talk about the UEF issues.

In Satterly, there's an agreed extension of time for the briefing and everything; is that correct?

MR. LUCK: Yes, Your Honor. We've agreed with claimants' counsel that we will extend the filing deadline for our brief from, is it the 25th, for ten

It will be due August the 8th. So August 8th, and when you serve that, e-mail them a copy so he gets it the same day; and then the same thing the Thursday before 4 August 22nd, which would be the 18th, and send him an 5 electronic copy as well. 6

MR. HUNT: August 8th is my birthday, so could you send me a birthday present also?

MR. LUCK: Certainly, right at midnight when we send it to you electronically.

THE COURT: Make sure it's one minute before midnight though.

The only remaining things I have to discuss are things particular to the Uninsured Funds, and then the asbestos litigation. Any of the insurers are free to leave unless they're interested in the UEF or asbestos litigation.

16 17 MR. ATWOOD: Judge, I'm going to bow out 18 then.

(Off the record briefly.)

20 THE COURT: Back on the record. Mark. 21 did you see Brian's memo?

MR. CADWALLADER: I did.

23 THE COURT: Here's my thoughts on that. 24 I think that the UEF, probably we ought to have you file a response; and in Flynn-Miller, you've got stuff Page 139

back to '74, and I know for a period you were

2 insolvent. You've also got some other problems for

3 other people here. There may be some current solvency 4 problems as far as UEF is concerned. I've been alerted

5 to the fact that there may be some sort of declaratory 6 judgment action coming in as to how we pay, because 7 they've got a case that's going to break the bank, as I

8 understand it.

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MR. CADWALLADER: There's at least one case that may break the UEF's bank, because the UEF is funded only through collections from uninsured employers. We are getting more and bigger claims than we have money to pay off.

THE COURT: So, you know, if I were you, what I would request you to do or request Brian to do is file a response outlining your situation and outlining what he said in here. I mean, if there are other defenses in there, go ahead and put them in.

On the Hyatt and Satterly decisions, does everybody have a copy of this memo?

MR. JONES: No.

THE COURT: Do you want to see it?

MR. JONES: No.

THE COURT: Does anybody want to see it?

MR. MURPHY: Is it posted?

understand this memo and some of the things that I've

seen the UEF responding to these common fund cases, 2

3 their position is: Well, if the claim is a 1987 claim

4 and we were insolvent in '87, then we don't have to pay

5 on that claim. Is that what I'm hearing from UEF, 6

Mark?

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MR. CADWALLADER: Yes. The short answer is yes, if it's prior to June 30th of 1987, the UEF was not paying out on any claim because of the statutory language about keeping proper reserves and surpluses; and there was about a six-year period where we basically -- where the UEF said, "We don't have any money to pay out new claims, and we're sorry, but that's how it is."

There was subsequent legislation that 16 refunded -- put more funds back into the UEF, but that has been the historical position, and there have been some cases where people have challenged that, but it's not -- I don't believe that there's been a direct frontal assault on that.

THE COURT: We've got some special problems with the UEF. Firstly, the question of whether or not they have any assets to pay it with and pay their current liabilities. Secondly, there was that insolvent period that goes back to '87; and third,

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THE COURT: No.

(Off the record briefly.)

THE COURT: On the Satterly and -- what was the other case?

MR. MURPHY: Hyatt.

THE COURT: -- Hyatt, you don't need to be trying to collect information on that anyway, so you're okay. I think if you want to appear in those cases, go ahead and do it. Those were the ones, well, Hyatt we've got service. We have a briefing schedule on that, don't we? Do we have a briefing schedule on Hyatt? Anybody remember?

MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor, insurers' reply briefs, final briefs, are due the 15th, tomorrow.

THE COURT: Really? Is that going to be submitted before I go on vacation in September?

MR. JONES: Well, I believe it's submitted, Your Honor, on submission of those briefs tomorrow.

THE COURT: Oh, gosh. Okay. Add that to my submitted list.

MS. WALLACE: Your Honor, is there a decision by the Court that says that UEF's liability for claims is based on whether they were solvent the year that the claim arose or is there -- As I

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there may be funding issues as far as some of the administrative costs, because that has to be a 3 legislative appropriation. If they don't have the manpower to do it, I mean, there's some practical 5 problems there.

6 In any event, we need to get whatever information we need from the UEF into the case and then we can deal with those questions and those problems. But we need, you know, I request you to go ahead and 10 file a response and lay it out.

And then, let's see --

MR. CADWALLADER: Your Honor, the UEF is working on gathering that information. We've got one person, Bernadette Rice, to do that, as well as handle the claims list that we do have.

16 THE COURT: I won't give you a deadline, but try to do it in the near future.

All right, the Rausch case, let's see here. Reesor, you know, you need to file a response. You indicated that -- or Brian indicated that there aren't any cases that Reesor applies to, so get a response on

22 that and let us know that.

23 And then in the Rausch case, I don't remember 24 what's going on in there, but apparently we don't know how many PTD and PPD cases are lumped together. Maybe

	Page 143		Page 145
1			
2	you can give us more information on what you're dealing	2	CERTIFICATE STATE OF MONTANA)
3	with in that as well. File something on that and let us know what you're dealing with.	-	:
4	MR. CADWALLADER: We'll pull the	3	COUNTY OF LEWIS AND CLARK)
5	information together the best we can and as promptly as	4	I, SHERRON K. WALSTAD, Professional Court
6	possible, Your Honor.	5	Reporter, Notary Public in and for the County of Lewis
7	THE COURT: And, you know, in all of	6	and Clark, State of Montana, do hereby certify:
8	these cases, you may want to set out your situation as	7	That the foregoing hearing proceedings were taken
9	far as your solvency is concerned. Is there going to	8	before me at the time and place herein named, that the proceedings were reported and transcribed by me with a
10	be a petition filed with the Court on the solvency	10	computer-aided transcription system, and that the
11	issue?	11	foregoing pages contain a true record of the
12	MR. CADWALLADER: Your Honor, it's my	12	proceedings to the best of my ability.
13	understanding that the matters are working their way	13	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
14	through mediation and that the UEF will eventually be	14 15	hand and affixed my notarial seal this day
15	in front of the Court and, amongst other issues,	16	of, 2005.
16	saying: We have a solvency problem and we're not sure	17	
17	how to deal with this.	18	
18	THE COURT: Okay. What fun. I'll add	19	A-MERI - MERI - L.
19	that to my list. I don't think Does anybody have	20	SHERRON K. WALSTAD
20	any other things they want to talk about with regard to	20	Court Reporter-Notary Public My Commission Expires 11/1/06
21	the UEF, any of the petitioners' attorneys?	21	My Commission Expires 11/1/00
22	Anybody have any other ideas as far as	22	
23	dealing with it until we at least get some sort of	23	
24 25	formal response?	24	
23	Okay, Mark, we'll let you go.	25	
	Page 144		
1	MR. JONES: Judge, any reason to stay on		
2	the record on asbestos?		
3	THE COURT: Does anybody want a record on		
4	this? Can we let Sherron go on the asbestos issue?		
5	We'll let you go. Thank you.		
6	(The portion of the hearing		
7	conducted on the record was		
8	concluded at 4:45 p.m.)		
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